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3Chapter 1
Introduction
Modern computers are becoming progressively more powerful with ever-improving process-
ing, storage, and networking capabilities. Typical desktop systems have more comput-
ing/communication resources than most users need and are underutilized most of the time.
These underutilized resources provide an interesting platform for new distributed applica-
tions and services.
We envision a future where the idle compute, storage, and networking resources of cheap
network-connected computers distributed around the world are harnessed to build meaning-
ful distributed services. Many others have espoused a similar vision. A variety of popular
peer-to-peer (P2P) services exploit the resources of their peers to implement speciﬁc func-
tionality, e.g., Kaaza [46], BitTorrent [20], and Skype [36]. The large body of work on
distributed hash tables (DHTs) exploit peer resources to support DHTs (e.g., Chord [43],
Pastry [67], Tapestry [80], and CAN [63]), on top of which a variety of services have been
built. SETI@home [69] and Entropia [16] farm out compute-intensive tasks from a central
server to participating nodes.
We propose a new way to harness idle resources as managed “collectives”. Rather than a
purely P2P solution, we introduce the notion of collective managers (CMs) that manage the
resources of large pools of untrusted, selﬁsh, and unreliable participating nodes (PN). PNs
contact CMs to make their resources available, in return for which they expect to receive
compensation. After registering with a CM, each PN runs a virtual machine (VM) image
provided by the CM. CMs remotely control these VMs and use their processing, storage,
and network resources to build distributed services. Unlike projects like Xenoservers [64],
a CM does not provide raw access to end node’s resources to external customers. A CM is
an application service provider, aggregating idle resources to provide services like content
distribution and remote backup. Figure 1.1 illustrates a possible use of a collective to im-
plement a commercial content distribution service that sells large content ﬁles (e.g., movies,
music, or software updates) to thousands of clients in a cost-eﬀective way.
The Collective uses an economic model based on currency. A collective manager earns
money in return for providing services and then shares its proﬁts with PNs in proportion to
their contribution towards diﬀerent services. The basic unit of compensation is a CM-speciﬁc
credit that acts as a kind of currency. Users can convert credits to cash or use them to buy
services from the CM or associated partners.
4Figure 1.1: Collective Content Distribution Service
Since collectives may include selﬁsh nodes, it is important to mitigate the negative ef-
fects of selﬁshness. Selﬁsh nodes can resort to cheating for earning more than their fair
share of compensation. Cheating behavior has been observed extensively in distributed sys-
tems, e.g., free riding in Gnutella [5] and software modiﬁcations to get more credit than
earned in SETI@home [44]. To mitigate negative impact of selﬁshness, we propose to em-
ploy economic deterrents comprised of an oﬄine data-analysis-based accounting system and
a consistency-based incentive model. Services are designed speciﬁcally to facilitate these
economic deterrents, and use security mechanisms to ensure accountability across diﬀer-
ent transactions. While we cannot prevent users from cheating, our mechanisms mitigate
cheating behavior by making it economically unattractive.
The collective system as a whole is a collection of distributed services built by aggregating
the idle resources provided by willing end-nodes in return for compensation. It provides a
simple but eﬃcient way to harness idle resources distributed across the Internet.
1.1 Design Space
Our target environment consists of potentially millions of end-nodes distributed all across the
Internet. They are untrusted, and unreliable - i.e., they suﬀer from frequent node churning
as well as failures. Each node can exhibit selﬁsh behaviors. Our goal is to use unutilized
resources of these end-nodes to build meaningful commercial services. Our design is similar
to a ﬁrm in traditional economic systems, where multiple people come together to work for
a common goal. Our incentive and interaction model is neither based on altruism, nor on
the bartering.
A system based on altruism relies on altruistic users that provide services without any
incentive, or provide more than the required service to others. For example, in the context
of ﬁle sharing P2P systems, altruistic users share the ﬁles on their computer even though
they do not get anything in return. They remain in the system after downloading a ﬁle
and upload the data to other users even when they are not required to do so. Systems like
gnutella and Kazaa were based on altruism. These systems eventually suﬀer from freeloading,
which degrades the quality of the network substantially. More importantly, these systems do
5not have an incentive model and thus are more useful for free or illegal content distribution
instead of a commercial system.
Bartering is the exchange of goods or services between two people in a mutually beneﬁ-
cial way. One can use bartering based mechanisms to provide incentives for interaction. We
categorize bartering systems into two categories - lazy bartering and active (currency-based)
bartering. We use the term “lazy bartering” for systems where people participate in the
system only long enough to perform a particular transaction such as downloading a song.
As stated above, this leads to the underutilization of a node’s resources unless the node’s
administrator is altruistic. BitTorrent is based on lazy bartering. To overcome this underuti-
lization problem, one may try active bartering, that is using bartering to maximally utilize
available resources (not just when a node needs some service in return). Using currencies
as an intermediary in bartering provides the necessary tool for achieving that. But it is
still tough to ﬁnd eligible users with whom to barter. One is limited by the goods (e.g.,
music/movies) that one has for sharing and by the availability of other users interested in
paying currency for the objects one owns. The inherent untrusted and unreliable nature
of end nodes makes currency-based bartering risky. For example, it is easy for a hacker to
use a currency-based bartering mechanism to acquire resources at multiple nodes, and then
use them for network attacks. Also, individual nodes can provide only a limited amount of
resources, so anyone interested in building a service like a content distribution system will
have to ﬁnd and make bartering agreements with many end nodes. This process has to be
repeated whenever a new service is built.
The collective model provides a useful approach to handle these problems in a simple but
realistic manner. In a collective, a user provide his/her resources to a collective manager and
gets paid in return. It is the responsibility of a collective manager to use those resources to
build distributed services and to deal with customers and clients. One way to think about
this is by comparing it to a person having $10000 of savings. He/she can either deposit their
savings in a bank and get paid interest (a la collective), or he/she can lend it to other people,
potentially getting a higher rate of return than provided by banks. Like bartering in P2P,
personal lending suﬀers from a trust problem; what if borrower does not return your money?
Additionally one has to search for potential borrowers and the savings remain unutilized
during the search period.
In a collective, a participating node shares its resources using a VM instance and provides
root access to that instance to the CM. Only the trusted collective manager has direct access
to the VM running on a participating node, so we do not need to worry about an unknown
party using the nodes for nefarious purposes, e.g., to launch network attacks. Second, the
collective system uses the long term association with nodes and the presence of a CM to
counteract the untrusted and unreliable nature of PNs. A collective manager provides a
simple service model to potential partners/customers, who do not have to worry about
inherent chaos of a system built out of end nodes.
We can compare a collective to the formation of organizations in real life. As human
civilization has progressed, there has been a clear move towards forming organizations -
whether it is universities, banks, manufacturing plants, or other commercial organizations.
While we still have freelancers, the majority of productive work is performed by well deﬁned
organizations.
6In some ways, a collective resembles the collections of zombie machines often used by
malicious users to launch distributed denial of service attacks. We diﬀer from “zombie nets”
in that we only use the resources of willing participants and allow PNs to limit how their
resources are used (e.g., no more than X kilobytes-per-second of network bandwidth).
1.2 Thesis Statement
In this thesis we will demonstrate that:
Using the collective approach, the idle compute, storage and networking resources of myr-
iad untrusted and unreliable computers distributed across the Internet can be harnessed ef-
fectively to build a set of useful distributed services with predictable performance, and with a
practical incentive model even in presence of selﬁsh behaviors.
By “practical incentive model” we mean that the collective system does not rely on
altruism to sustain the system. The system provides incentives for nodes to participate
in the system for extended durations. Also, all services built on collective are designed
to provide incentives for the actual work performed and to handle selﬁsh behavior by the
participating nodes.
By “harnessing eﬀectively” we mean that the collective system provides good utilization
of a node’s perishable idle resources. For example, in an incentive model that employs
bartering, e.g., BitTorrent, nodes typically participate in the system only long enough to
perform a particular transaction such as downloading a song. At other times, that node’s
idle resources are not utilized. In contrast, the collective system tries to consume as much
resources as possible by scheduling diverse pools of work on a node. Using idle resources to
run arbitrary services, rather than only services that the local user uses, improves resource
utilization.
By “predictable performance” we mean that the collective manager can probabilistically
understand the demand as well as current capabilities of the collective system. That is, a
collective manager can dynamically take actions to minimize the impact of varying client
demand, as well as inherent unreliability of a system built out of end-nodes. To achieve this,
the collective system tracks all sort of past as well as live information, e.g., participating
nodes’ resource proﬁles, their past performance, service demand rates, dishonest behaviors
etc. These diverse information are then used to make informed scheduling decisions, i.e., the
system is tuned according to its own inherent characteristics.
To support this hypothesis, we built a collective system and developed two distributed
services: a collective content distribution service, and a collective backup service.
The ﬁrst service, collective content distribution service (CCDS), is a way to distribute
big content ﬁles (e.g., movie videos, music, software updates, etc.) to thousands of clients in
a cost-eﬀective way. Instead of typical web-server style downloading of paid content, content
distributors can hire the CCDS service to distribute content on their behalf. It is quite
diﬀerent from peer to peer, as clients directly download from the overlay without sharing
anything. Recently there has been an explosion in legal content distribution over the Inter-
net, e.g., the highly successful iPod and iTunes services. Many prognosticators predict that
the Internet will soon become the predominant means for audio and video distribution. The
typical infrastructure required to support such distribution (e.g., Apple’s iTune music server)
7is a large dedicated clustered web service with immense external bandwidth. A system that
can handle millions of multi-gigabyte (video) downloads per day requires tremendous infras-
tructure and administrative costs. Demand for these kinds of services is clearly increasing,
and our collective model can support them eﬀectively.
Our second service is a collective backup service (CBS), which is a paid backup system
that allows clients to store and retrieve data ﬁles over the collective system. All data is
encrypted at the client computer before being submitted to the CBS. As in CCDS, from
the client perspective it is a client-server solution. Clients do not have to be PNs to avail
themselves of the CBS service. Rather, clients use a small application to store and retrieve
data and are charged based on usage. Alternatively, clients could “pay” using credits they
receive for becoming a PN in the collective system. Online backup is becoming an important
service for millions of home and small business communities that do not want to spend money
on professional in-house backup services.
Apart from these two services, we envision many more services that can be built on top
of the collective overlay. We discuss some of these services, e.g, a collective compute service
(CCS) and a collective network probing service (CNPS) in Chapter 9.
1.3 Scope
As part of this dissertation, we design, build and evaluate an infrastructure that harnesses
the idle resources of end nodes distributed across the Internet. We are not proposing a
generic library that can be used to compose multiple services.
Not all services can be easily supported on top of a collective system. To map a service
eﬀectively to a collective, the service should be decomposable into multiple components;
it should have a mechanism to handle the failure of individual components; it should be
possible to check the correctness of the service delivered by components; and it should be
possible to design a selﬁsh behavior protection model for the service.
Some of the basic mechanisms to compensate for the unreliable and untrusted nature of
participating nodes can be utilized across services, and thus can be developed as a library.
But this is not the main focus of our work.
Both the clients and participating nodes in our system are untrusted. They are assumed
to be selﬁsh nodes that acts to maximize their utility in a rational manner. Selﬁsh nodes
try to get credits without performing the required work or try to get more than their fair
share of credits. Multiple selﬁsh nodes (both clients and PNs) can collude with each other
to increase their utility even further. We assume that a single colluding group consists of
only a small percentage of the overall nodes in the system.
We assume all communication channels between nodes and collective manager are asyn-
chronous, but resilient, i.e., they deliver correct data after a ﬁnite amount of time.
1.4 Contributions
Our ﬁrst contribution is a practical incentive system that motivates participating nodes to
participate consistently and stay in the system for long durations. We use an incentive
8model based on currency that rewards actual work performed, as well as the consistency
of the work. That is, a node’s long term associations and continued performance lead to
improved incentives for the node. We examine the impact of decisions made by selﬁsh nodes
and analyze the gain vs loss possibilities for participating nodes as we vary the likelihood
of cheaters being caught. We show that while we cannot prevent users from cheating, our
mechanisms mitigate cheating behavior by making it economically unattractive. We show
that a small probability of catching cheaters (under 4%) is suﬃcient for creating a success-
ful deterrence against cheating. We further show that our incentive system can be used
successfully to motivate nodes to remain in the system for prolonged durations.
Our second contribution is a collection of security and economic mechanisms designed
to overcome cheating in a collective content distribution service (CCDS) and in a collec-
tive backup service (CBS). These security and economic mechanisms along with a oﬄine
accounting system provide successful deterrents against cheating. We not only handle indi-
vidual cheating behaviors, but also consider collusion among participating nodes and even
clients.
Our third contribution is the use of information-aware scheduling to handle the inherent
unreliability and heterogeneity of the end-nodes. That is, a collective manager tracks sig-
niﬁcant historic and live information, e.g., participating nodes’ resource proﬁles, their past
performance, service demand rates etc. This diverse information is then used to make in-
formed scheduling decisions, e.g., creating additional replicas for a content dynamically in
response to an increased demand or deciding the replication degree needed for the remote
backup service based on past records of node failures. This information-aware and adaptive
scheduling provides us with the tools necessary to overcome the chaotic nature of end-nodes’
ability and availability.
1.5 Outline
This dissertation is organized into ten chapters. In chapter 2, we discuss the problem context
and provide a simple cost analysis of a collective system. In chapter 3, we describe the
architecture of a collective system, its security infrastructure, and its incentive model. In
chapter 4, we discuss the design of the collective content distribution service (CCDS) and
its incentive model. We consider diﬀerent type of cheating behaviors and show how our
mechanisms mitigate cheating behavior by making it economically unattractive. In chapter 5,
we discuss the design of the collective backup service (CBS) and its incentive model. In
chapter 6 we evaluate our incentive model from an economic standpoint. We demonstrate
how our incentive system motivates nodes to stay in the system for prolonged duration and
deters cheating behaviors. Next we describe and analyze our information aware scheduling
system in chapter 7. We show that the underlying diversity of end-nodes can be exploited in a
simple but useful manner to improve service performances. We then discuss implementation
speciﬁc details and scalability issues in chapter 8. In chapter 9 we discuss other possible
services that can be built on top of a collective overlay. Finally we summarize this dissertation
in chapter 10.
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Background and Motivation
Modern computers have become quite powerful over the years, and typically have more
processing, storage, and communication resources than most user need, and remain under-
utilized. A veriﬁcation of this can be seen from the success of systems like seti@home,
Gnutella, Kazaa, and BitTorrent. Based on data from Jan 2004 to June 2004, CacheLogic
reported that peer-to-peer systems (P2P) consume 80% or more of the traﬃc for last mile
service providers [15]. Another study from CacheLogic put the P2P percentage of Internet
traﬃc at about 60% at the end of 2004 [14]. The same study reports that BitTorrent was
responsible for as much as 30% of all Internet traﬃc at the end of 2004 [14].
Our collective system intends to harness these unutilized resources of already deployed
computers. Our target nodes can be either home desktops or computers deployed in com-
munities or enterprise environments. These nodes are bought and deployed to serve some
speciﬁc purpose, but their resources are not utilized 100% all the time. The goal of the
collective system is to harness these unutilized resources to build commercial services, and
distribute the proﬁts back to participating nodes.
2.1 Problem Context
Our collective model, while similar in certain aspects to previous work, diﬀers in a number of
important ways. There are four main domains of related projects that also deal with utilizing
the resources of computers distributed across the Internet. The ﬁrst is peer to peer systems
like bittorrent [20], gnutella [29] etc. The second is compute-only services like seti@home [69],
entropia [16] etc. The third is utility computing systems like Xenoservers [64]. The fourth
is grid computing systems [26].
Peer to Peer Services:
Unlike typical P2P systems, we do not assume that PNs are altruistic (e.g., Kazaa [46] or
Gnutella [29]) or willing to “barter” their resources in return for access to the end service (e.g.,
BitTorrent [20]). Rather, PNs make their resources available to CMs to build distributed
services, in return for which they are compensated by CMs.
Using idle resources to run arbitrary services, rather than only services that the local user
uses, improves resource utilization. A node’s compute and network resources are perishable
10— if they are not used, their potential value is lost. In an incentive model that employs
bartering, e.g., BitTorrent, nodes typically participate in the system only long enough to
perform a particular transaction such as downloading a song. At other times, that node’s
idle resources are not utilized unless the node’s administrator is altruistic. In the collective,
a CM will have much larger and more diverse pools of work than personal needs of individual
participants; thus a CM will be better able to consume the perishable resources of PNs. PNs,
in turn, will accumulate credits for their work, which they can use in the future however they
wish (e.g., for cash or for access to services provided by the CM). In a sense, we are moving
the incentive model from a primitive barter model to a more modern currency model.
Additionally in a collective the CM has direct control over the VMs running in partici-
pating nodes. This control can be utilized to provide a predictable service to the customers,
e.g., the CM can dynamically change the caching patterns in response to sudden demand.
Distributed Compute Intensive Services:
Unlike seti@home [69] and Entropia [16], the idle storage and networking resources of
PNs can be harnessed, in addition to idle processing resources. As a result, collectives can
be used to implement distributed services (e.g., content distribution or remote backup) in
addition to compute-intensive services. These services have diﬀerent design chanllenges than
compute intensive services.
First, seti@home or other compute-only services are embarrassingly parallel and does not
require any interaction between diﬀerent nodes. Services like content distribution or backup
services require cooperation from multiple nodes to successfully cache/replicate a piece of
content, and to provide service to the customers. Handling these interactions (e.g., multiple
node collusion) while still being able to manage selﬁsh behaviors is a much diﬀerent and
tougher problem than handling embarrassingly parallel applications.
Second, applications like content distribution or remote backup require timely delivery
of service to customers – thus adding a real time response component. There are no similar
real-time requirements in seti@home-like applications.
Third, applications like content distribution or remote backup require diﬀerent mecha-
nisms and design to detect selﬁsh behaviors by participating nodes.
Utility Computing Systems:
Utility computing systems like Xenoservers [64], Planetlab [61], and SHARP [27] deal
with similar problems, but these systems handle resource sharing at the granularity of VMs,
and are not bothered about the design and challenges of building a service using those
resources.
For example, unlike collectives these systems do not provide solutions for service level
selﬁsh behaviors by the participating nodes (or sites). Many of these assume trusted nodes.
Projects like SHARP [27] assume that the service managers have some external means to ver-
ify that each site provides contracted resources and that they function correctly (assumption
7 in their paper [27]).
The focus of these projects are dedicated powerful servers of high reliability. While in
collective, our main focus is to harness the idle resources of unreliable end-nodes.
Similar to these projects, PNs in a collective exploit VM technology for safely run-
ning arbitrary untrusted code provided by CMs. But unlike utility computing projects
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only one VM on a node, and run multiple services inside that one VM. In other systems any
untrusted third party can acquire VMs and potentially use them for nefarious activities like
network attacks. In contrast, our one VM per participating node is only controlled by the
trusted collective manager.
Grid Computing Systems:
Systems like Condor [52] manage the idle resources of collections of nodes, but typically
manage the resources of trusted nodes that remain in the “pool” for substantial periods of
time. In contrast, we assume that PNs are unreliable (frequently fail or leave the collective)
and are non-altruistic (will do as little productive work as possible while maximizing their
compensation).
Systems like computational grids [26] also deal with distributed resources at multiple
sites, though again their main focus is on trusted and dedicated servers.
2.2 Clusters and Cloud Computing
Instead of using un-utilized resources of end-nodes distributed across the Internet, one can
potentially use a cluster of PCs to provide similar services. Cloud Computing Systems like
Amazon Web Services [4] (AWS) provide another alternative where users can rent resources
on a cluster and pay based on actual usage of resources.
In contrast to dedicated resources of a cluster, the focus of a collective is the un-utilized
resources of nodes distributed across the Internet. That is, it is trying to monetize resources
(cycles, storage, and network) that have already been paid for to support something else
(e.g., I already own a PC so I can surf the net; business already have machines that they
use to run their business).
Secondly, a collective is a self-upgradeable system. End-nodes are upgraded in due time
by their users, thus it gets the advantage of technology advancements for free. It does not
require huge amount of initial investment that is needed for a setting up a big cluster.
Thirdly, nodes in a collective are geographically dispersed across the Internet. This
geographic dispersion is inherently useful for some apps, e.g., one can utilize the geographic
dispersion of nodes to build a distributed network probing service. Such a service can be
helpful in debugging of network routing and DNS problems.
From research perspective, a collective has diﬀerent set of challenges due to (i) unreliable
end nodes, (ii) untrusted and selﬁsh end nodes, (iii) geographically distributed end-nodes
instead of a local network in a cluster, and (iv) limited resources per node. To understand
the business implications though, we do a quick cost analysis to compare a collective against
a cluster and a cloud computing approach.
2.2.1 Cost Analysis
In this subsection, we do a quick quantitative analysis to understand the opportunity cost of
a collective in comparison to the cluster and cloud computing approach. We ﬁrst estimate
the resource capabilities of a collective system consisting of one million nodes. We then
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self-managed and a cloud computing approach.
Assumptions: In this analysis, we assume that 10% resources of a given node are available
when the end-user is actively using the node; 100% resources are available otherwise. We
assume that on average a node is used actively for 10 hours per day by the end-user. We
further assume an average upload bandwidth of 50 KBps (i.e., what Comcast cable Internet
provides currently to non-commercial customers), which is quite conservative considering
that other broadband options like DSL, VVD Communication [76] or Utopia [74] provide
better bandwidth, and countries like South Korea and Japan have broadband connections
providing Mbps of upload bandwidth. We assume that each node in the collective contributes
on average 5GB of storage, which is a quite conservative estimate considering the sizes of
modern hard disks. For processing capabilities, we assume a 2GHz processor with 1GB of
RAM.
Collective
A million nodes with 50 KBps of upload bandwidth means an available aggregate upload
bandwidth of 50 GBps. Since we assume that on average only 10% of each node’s capacity
is available for 10 hours each day, we can probabilistically estimate the available upload
bandwidth as (5 ∗ 10 + 50 ∗ 14)/24, i.e., 31.25 GBps at any instant, although not constant.
Similarly we can estimate that at any instant this collective will have processing capabilities
worth (0.2∗10+2∗14)/24∗106 = 1.25 * 106 GHz. For storage, disk space remains available
all the time irrespective of the node’s use by the end-user or not. Thus we estimate 5∗106GB
of available storage.
Typically there will be an overhead in terms of bandwidth and storage to maintain
service level properties. For example, bandwidth will be used to maintain caching in a
content distribution system. Similarly there will be storage overhead to maintain durability
(using either straightforward replication or erasure coding). Assuming 10% overhead for
bandwidth, we are left with 28.125 GBps of bandwidth. Assuming 80% overhead for storage
(required for 4 extra replicas), we are left with 106 GB of storage available.
Self Managed Cluster
Assuming dual core 2*3GHz machines, we can build a comparable computing cluster using
(1.25∗106)/6) = 200K such machines. So let us use 100K machines as a conservative estimate
for our analysis here. Assuming each machine costs around $1000 including storage, the
initial investments for such a cluster will be around $100 million. Plus we will need to
upgrade such cluster periodically to keep up with technology advancements. Assuming a
5-year life cycle, we need to depreciate it at $40M per year, i.e, $1.66M per month.
To estimate data center and bandwidth costs, we use the colocation costs advertised on
websites like creativedata.net, colocation.com, and apvio.net as a guide. For bandwidth, the
typical costs advertised on were around $45 per Mbps per month. Using that estimate, for
28.125 GBps we require 28.125∗8∗1000∗45 = $10.125 million per month. Typical cabinet
prices for these datacenters start at $650 for 40 units. Using this as an estimate, we require
1350∗ 1000∗ 650/40 = $0.8125 million per month. Adding these two costs and ignoring setup
fees and related costs, we require $10.93 million per month to operate.
As reﬂected in some of the TCO (total cost of ownership) studies available on Internet,
administrative personal costs are one of the biggest part of overall cost of managing a cluster.
For example, a TCO study by the hostbasket web hosting company [72] puts the labor cost
at 54% of total cost, while Aruba.it [71] puts the labor cost at 41% of the total cost. We do
not have any good way to quantify our costs here, so we use a conservatively estimate of $3
million per month for labor costs.
Thus overall we will need around $15.5 M per month to build a cluster equivalent to a
million node collective.
Utility Computing Services from Amazon
Amazon web services provides cloud computing services for computing, storage, and band-
width through Simple Storage Service (S3) and Edge Computing Service (EC2). EC2
provides an instance of 1.7Ghz x86 processor, 1.75GB of RAM, 160GB of local disk, and
250Mb/s of network bandwidth. It has following prices: $0.10 per instance-hour consumed,
$0.20 per GB of data transferred into/out of Amazon (i.e., Internet traﬃc). S3 has the fol-
lowing pricing: $0.15 per GB-Month of storage used and $0.20 per GB of data transferred.
Considering the computing resources of 1.25 * 106 GHz, we will require around 735K
instances. Let’s take an conservative estimate of 300K instances for 24x30 hours; it will
cost (300 ∗ 1000 ∗ 0.1 ∗ 24 ∗ 30) = 21.6 million dollars per month. These machines will have
enough storage space available for matching 5∗106 GB storage of collective. If we use S3 for
storage, we will require 0.15 million dollars per month. For bandwidth, costs are same for
both EC2 and S3. Based on 28.125GB/s, we will require 14.58 million dollars per month for
bandwidth. This is a very conservative estimate, as amazon does not promise a bandwidth
of 28.125 GBps with that pricing.
Thus overall we will require around $36M per month to have a system comparable to a
million node collective.
Opportunity
Now that we have a quantitative idea of the cost of a collective-equivalent cluster, we can
use that to get an estimate of potential rewards possible for participating nodes. So from
the raw resource point of view, a collective can provide around $15 to $30 per month to
participating nodes having resources as deﬁned in above assumptions. From a service point
of view, services built on collective overlay may be worth much more than raw resources, and
hence it may be possible to give even better returns. Additionally a collective can provide
return services to the PNs in addition to direct cash payout. This can increase the proﬁt
margins even more.
2.3 Summary
In this Chapter we have discussed the usefulness of a collective system in comparison to
existing systems. The collective model is a better alternative to the P2P (e.g., Kazaa, Bit-
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of end-nodes. The collective system has a meaningful economic model, can eﬀectively utilize
idle resources of end-nodes, and is better suited for building legal and commercial distributed
services.
On business side, clusters and cloud computing systems are the main competitors for
building commercial services similar to the collective. We have used a simple cost analysis
to show that the collective remains a viable alternative from price point of view. The value of
collective will improve further as end-nodes capabilities (especially bandwidth) will increase
substantially over the years. Additionally the collective system has inherent advantages due
to geographic distribution and self-upgradability of participating nodes.
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System Design
The collective system as a whole is a collection of distributed services built by aggregating
the idle resources provided by willing end-nodes in return for compensation. Figure 3.1
illustrates the main players in a collective. These are:
1. Participating Nodes (PNs) are end nodes that have idle compute, storage, or net-
work resources. They are typically connected to the Internet though some sort of
broadband service. These nodes have diﬀerent compute/communication capabilities,
go up and down in unpredictable ways, and are inherently untrusted.
2. Collective Managers (CMs) are service providers to whom individual nodes provide
their idle resources. A CM uses these resources to provide a set of meaningful services
to clients and then compensates the PNs. Multiple competing CMs can co-exist, each
providing diﬀerent services and/or pricing models.
3. Partners are commercial collaborators of a CM that use the collective overlay to
oﬄoad part of their tasks. E.g., an online movie distribution company can utilize the
collective service for movie distribution, while managing the content acquisition and
sales itself.
4. Clients are individuals that wish to utilize the services oﬀered by CMs, e.g., using
a collective remote backup service or downloading a video from the collective content
distribution service.
As an example, let us consider the collective content distribution service (CCDS). Here
a content distribution partner collaborates with the CM to provide a content distribution
service. The content distributor interfaces with the collective manager to distribute desired
content. The collective manager divides the content into multiple chunks, and proactively
caches them across multiple PNs.
Clients run an application, e.g., an iTunes content download application, that interacts
directly with the content distributor for browsing and sales. After a client purchases a
particular song or video, the content distributor sends it a signed certiﬁcate that gives the
client the right to download the song/video from the CCDS overlay network and a contact
list of PNs. The client then downloads the content directly from PNs, with diﬀerent chunks
coming from diﬀerent nodes.
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This chapter presents the overall design of a collective system. We start by discussing the
participating node architecture in Section 3.1 and then describe the design of the collective
manager in Section 3.2. We then present the security related details in Section 3.3. Next we
describe the collective incentive model in Section 3.4 and then summarize in Section 3.5.
3.1 Participating Nodes
To provide resources to a CM, a PN runs a VM instance and provides root access to that
instance to the CM. The decision to use a virtual machine instance as the unit of resource
allocation has several important advantages over alternative approaches. Virtual machine
technology provides greater isolation, ﬂexibility, and resource control than simply running
application processes directly on top of a standard Unix or Windows box.
In terms of isolation, applications running on a virtual machine instance cannot directly
interfere with applications running on the host machine, nor can they access resources (e.g.,
the ﬁle system) reserved for the host machine. VM technology makes it eﬀectively impossible
for rogue client software to access resources to which it does not have access rights, install
viruses, or “crack root”.
The virtual machine monitor can enforce resource controls (e.g., disk quota, cpu share,
and physical memory allocation) on a per-VM basis. This design allows normal work to
proceed on the host machine without undue impact by applications running on a VM. The
protection and resource controls provided by VMs will make people more willing to make
their machines accessible to a collective overlay, without fear that they will be misused or
infected.
Using VM technology also provides advantages to a collective manager. A collective
manager has root access and can install and execute arbitrary software on participating
nodes. This design provides tremendous ﬂexibility – what a collective manager can do is not
limited by what some middleware layer supports. Programmers can use diﬀerent middleware
layers like CORBA, RPC, or SOAP based on their needs, which enables our system to support
a wide variety of distributed services and applications. For our prototype, we use the free
VMware Player [75] and Xen [8] for the VM layer.
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In addition to the VM, each PN runs a small node-agent. The node-agent handles the
basic interaction between the user and CM, e.g., to determine when the node has suﬃcient
idle resources to warrant joining the CM’s collective or to start/stop the VM. The node-
agent provides a simple UI through which the user can set limits on the resources provided
to the collective (e.g., limits on disk/memory space or limits on network bandwidth that
may vary depending on the time of day). The node-agent also provides a way for the host
to temporarily suspend/resume the collective’s VM.
3.2 Collective Manager
A collective manager is the core hub of a collective and is overall responsible for smooth
functioning of the system. Figure 3.2 shows the high level architecture of a collective. There
are three main components of a collective manager - service managers, node manager, and
a scheduler. Service Managers are per service agents that manage service-speciﬁc activities
in the system. The node manager tracks the set of PNs currently registered with the CM
and is also responsible for uploading of required executables and libraries to PNs. The
scheduler helps schedule the resources on individual PNs with active collaboration with
service managers.
3.2.1 Service Managers
A service built on a collective consists of a central component that runs collocated on the
CM, called service manager. A service manager is responsible for overall performance of a a
service in the collective and is designed based on service-speciﬁc requirements.
A service manager regularly interacts with its corresponding service partner (e.g., content
distributor for the CCDS service) to get the list of tasks that need to be oﬄoaded to the
collective overlay. It then converts these tasks into small components and distributes these
components to a set of PNs with the help of the scheduler. It also continuously monitors the
service performance, validates it against service goals, and takes actions to add or remove
more resources as and whenever needed.
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The node manager tracks the set of PNs currently registered with the CM. It is also respon-
sible for shipping of necessary executables and data to the PNs based on service manager
requests.
An important part of node manager is liveness server that keeps track of nodes’ liveness
in the overlay and tracks node failures. It uses multiple methods to detect node failures (or
churn) in a timely fashion. These methods can be divided into two main categories:
• Centralized tracking mechanism: Every node sends a join/leave message to a
centralized liveness server whenever it joins the collective or shuts down gracefully.
• Application-level alertness mechanism: The CM, other PNs, and clients regularly
contact other nodes as part of normal service operations. If they are unable to contact
a node, they inform the liveness server.
In particular, whenever a participating node joins/rejoins the collective, it pings the node
manager with an ’I-came-online’ message. On receiving that, the node manager adds that
node to the active node list. That node remains there until the node-manager receives a
direct or indirect indication of node’s not being online. A direct indication is sent by a node-
agent if a user temporarily disables the node’s participation in collective or when a node
shutdowns gracefully (e.g. as part of node’s shutdown). Indirect indications are reported
either by service manager, clients or other PNs, whenever they happen to contact the node
for certain data, and does not get any response. On direct indication, CM removes the node
from the active list. Indirect indications may be a genuine shutdown or failure, but it can
also result from network partitioning, or due to wrong reporting by a malicious client/PN.
So on indirect indication, CM adds the list to a check-alive list. CM pings the nodes on
check-alive list few times (mostly when CM is free from other work) before it removes the
node from active list.
3.2.3 Information Aware Scheduler
One of the biggest challenge of CM is to eﬀectively utilize the resources of participating nodes
towards meaningful activities. CM need to understand the importance, and resourcefulness
of individual nodes, and should try to maximize the utilization of its idle resources. At
the same time, appropriate resources should be made available to the diﬀerent services to
maintain acceptable performance.
The core of the scheduler is based on a mix of information aware and adaptive strategies.
It tracks all sort of past as well as live information, e.g., participating nodes’ resource proﬁles,
their past performance, service demand rates etc. These diverse information are then used
to make informed scheduling decisions. We can divide information aware scheduling process
into three main categories: history aware scheduling, reactive scheduling, and network aware
scheduling.
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The collective incentive model rewards consistency of participating nodes and hence it leads
to nodes staying for longer duration in the system. This provides an opportunity to learn
about participating nodes’ available resources and performance over an extended period of
time. This information is used strategically during scheduling of services.
A collective manager (CM) periodically collects historical data about all participating
nodes in the system. The historical data is collected with the help of a small agent called
node-agent that runs on every node participating in a collective. A node-agent collects lot of
useful information - e.g., observed upload bandwidth, node’s boot up timings etc., and send
these information to the collective manager periodically (e.g., after every 3 days). Based
on these information, the collective manager has an idea about each participating node
resources, and its past history about active/non-active timings in the collective. Typically
the collective manager creates diﬀerent clusters (information lists) based on diﬀerent desired
behaviors - e.g., nodes having longest active time during last 5 days, during last month, or
node having highest upload bandwidth etc. These information lists are then used to make
informed decisions for various activities, e.g., to decide the caching pattern of a content.
Nodes can be grouped based on a node’s up/down timings, a node computing or storage or
networking capabilities or a node network location.
Reactive Scheduling
As part of reactive scheduling, a collective system can reactively take actions based on
observed dynamic behaviors. These actions lead to adaptive scheduling of resources to ﬁt
changing circumstances. Main methods for reactive scheduling are as follows:
• Service Demand: A collective manager can monitor service demand rate with the
help of partners (e.g. content distributor in CCDS) and then use that information to
achieve better scheduling of resources. For example, if a there is a rise in a particular
content demand (e.g., from a sale of 10 per day to 1000 per day), the scheduler can
increase replication to handle the increased load.
• Churning Detection: Another technique is to detect failures/churning and then take
actions to mask those failures by creating more replicas when a previous replica fails.
• Client Reports: Another approach to get feedback is based on performance reports
sent by client application. For example, if a client application downloading a content
does not get suﬃcient bandwidth, it can send a report to the collective manager. The
collective manager can then take actions to ﬁx the problem by creating more replicas
or moving replicas to better nodes.
Network Aware Scheduling
Network aware scheduling utilizes network characterstics of participating nodes to take in-
formed scheduling decisions. For example, a university network or an ISP like utopia net-
work [74] have signiﬁcant intra-domain bandwidth that is way higher than its Internet band-
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bandwidth than a node anywhere else in the Internet.
Additionally some services may have speciﬁc network requirements. For example, we
discuss a collective network probing service in Section 9.2 where probing tasks are assigned
based on a node’s ISP or other speciﬁc network characterstics.
3.3 Security
The basic security problems that must be addressed in a collective infrastructure are (i) how
to uniquely identify and authenticate each entity, (ii) how to ensure that a PN is not misused
or corrupted as a side-eﬀect of participating in a collective, and (iii) how to handle selﬁsh or
malicious behaviors.
We discuss the high level security architecture in this section. Other service level security
mechanisms (e.g., non-repudiation protocol used in CCDS and CBS) are discussed along with
service design in Sections 4 and 5.
3.3.1 Identity and Authentication
Each PN and each client is identiﬁed by a unique machine-generated ID and a unique pub-
lic/private key pair. The CM acts as the root of the public key infrastructure (PKI) employed
by its collective. Each PN and client is issued a certiﬁcate signed by the CM that associates
the public key of the PN or client with their unique IDs. Similarly each partner also is
identiﬁed by a unique public/private key pair. These keys and certiﬁcates are used to create
secure communication channels and to digitally sign the reports sent to the CM.
3.3.2 Trust and Access Control at PNs
The collective uses a VM sandboxing environment where a PN runs a VM instance to provide
resources to a CM. This ensures that the collective software is isolation from the host PN.
That is, applications running inside the VM cannot directly interfere nor access resources
belonging to the host PN. Additionally the host PN can enforce resource controls such as
disk quota, cpu share, and physical memory allocation for the VM. This allows normal work
to proceed on the host PN without undue impact. The protection and resource controls
provided by VM technology will make people more willing to make their machines accessible
to the collective, without fear that they will be misused or infected.
Even though VMs provides good isolation, a malicious user can still misuse the virtual
machine to launch network attacks [32]. This problem is handled through access control,
i.e., a VM instance on a PN can only be directly controlled by the CM. We do not allow
external entities to run arbitrary code on VMs. All entities other than the CM interact with
VMs only through a well deﬁned application-level protocol.
On the ﬂip side, a host PN can get complete access to the VM running on it. A selﬁsh
PN administrator can potentially see or even modify ﬁles and data loaded on the virtual
machine. Selﬁsh behaviors and prevention mechanisms are discussed in Section 3.4 along
with the incentive model used in collective.
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Malicious nodes, clients, or external entities are interested in disrupting a collective without
any beneﬁt to them (in contrast to selﬁsh entities that try to maximize their personal gain).
We do not focus on these issues as part of this dissertation, and they remain part of the
future work.
3.4 Incentive Model and Deterring Cheating Behav-
iors
Since collectives may include cheating nodes, it is important to mitigate the negative eﬀects of
cheating behavior. Cheating nodes strive to earn more than their fair share of compensation.
Selﬁsh behavior has been observed extensively in distributed systems, e.g., free riding in
Gnutella [5] and software modiﬁcations to get more credit than earned in SETI@home [44].
For a collective system to work, the system must discourage dishonest behaviors (e.g.,
cheating users who lie about how many resources they have provided) and encourage nodes
to stay in the collective for extended periods of time.
To address these challenges, we have designed an incentive system based on game theory
and the economic theory behind law enforcement that motivates just these behaviors. In
1968, Becker [9] presented an economic model of criminal behavior where actors compare
the expected costs and expected beneﬁts of oﬀending, and only commit crimes when the
expected gains exceed the expected costs. Since then there has been signiﬁcant research
extending the work of Becker – Polinsky et. al [62] provides a comprehensive overview of the
research dealing with deterrents in law enforcement. In this section we describe our incentive
system and our mechanisms to discourage dishonesty.
In a collective system, a PN’s compensation is based on how much its resources contribute
to the success of services running on the collective. A CM shares its proﬁts with PNs in pro-
portion to their contribution towards diﬀerent services. For example, in the CCDS example,
PNs will receive a fraction of the money paid by the content distributor roughly proportional
to the fraction of the total content that they deliver. The basic unit of compensation is a
CM-speciﬁc credit that acts as a kind of currency. Users can convert credits to cash or use
them to buy services from the CM or associated partners.
For the incentive system to work, the CM needs an accurate accounting of each PN’s
contribution. The CM cannot simply trust the contribution reported by each node, since
selﬁsh nodes can exaggerate their contributions. In this section we discuss how we create
deterrence against cheating behavior.
3.4.1 Contribution Accounting and Accountability
Contribution accounting is mostly done at the service level and depends on the design of the
service involved. The basic idea is to collect information from multiple sources (e.g., PNs,
partners, clients, and the CM) and do oﬄine data analysis to decide the individual node’s
contribution. We employ the following mechanisms:
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vocation, e.g., downloading a movie, should be credited to the appropriate PNs. Each PN
sends a detailed daily report of its activities to the CM. In the absence of cheating PNs,
each service activity can be credited to unique contributing PNs. If one or more nodes are
cheating, more than one node will request credit for the same work. To resolve such conﬂicts,
the accounting system needs additional information.
Accountability: Each PN and each client is identiﬁed by a unique public/private key
pair. The CM acts as the root of the public key infrastructure (PKI) employed by its collec-
tive. Each PN and client is issued a certiﬁcate signed by the CM that associates the public
key of the PN or client with their unique IDs. These keys and certiﬁcates are used to create
secure communication channels and to digitally sign the reports sent to the CM.
Oﬄine Cheater Detection: To identify cheating nodes, the system collects data from
PNs, CM scheduling records, service scheduling records, partners’ sales records, and even
completion reports by client applications (if available). This data is used to resolve con-
ﬂicts by comparing what work nodes claim they did against what other entities claim was
done. Conﬂict resolution is done oﬄine periodically (e.g., daily). With multiple information
sources, it is possible to detect cheating behaviors by PNs. However, we do not assume that
CMs will be able to detect all instances of cheating behaviors. In Chapter 6 we show that
our incentive model works even when we can only detect 4%-5% of cheating behaviors.
Collusion: Of course, PNs can collude with each other and with clients. Collusion allows
cheaters to confuse the CMs by providing incorrect reports from multiple channels. We
counteract this by using service-speciﬁc mechanisms to make it economically un-attractive
to collude.
3.4.2 Variable Pay Rates (Raises and Cuts)
To provide an incentive for nodes to provide stable resource levels and to penalize cheating,
the amount of credits received by a node in return for work depends on the node’s long
term consistency. A node that remains in the CM’s pool for long periods of time and that
provides continuous predictable performance receives more credit for a unit of work than a
node that ﬂits in and out of the CM’s pool.
Credit-per-unit-work (pay) rates are divided into levels. PNs enter the system at the
lowest pay rate; a node’s pay rate increases as it demonstrates stable consistent contributions
to the collective. The number of levels and the behavior required to get a “pay raise” are
conﬁgurable parameters for any given service.
To discourage cheating behavior, the system can apply a pay cut when it identiﬁes a node
mis-reporting the amount of work it performs. The size of the pay cut can be conﬁgured on
a per-service basis. Selﬁsh behavior in one service leads to pay cuts in other services run
on that node. As an alternative, we could ban PNs from the system when they are caught
cheating, but doing so eliminates nodes who might “learn their lesson” after ﬁnding that
cheating does not pay in the long run. If a node continues to cheat, its pay rate becomes
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same eﬀect as simply banning them.
Other factors can be applied to determine a particular node’s pay rate. For example,
nodes that are particularly important to a given service due to their location or unique
resources (e.g., a fat network pipe or extremely high availability) may receive a bonus pay
rate to encourage them to remain part of the CM’s pool.
3.4.3 Incentive Model Summary
Our incentive model employs a currency-based system that rewards work performed, as well
as the consistency of the work. Further, it is a well known phenomenon in game theory
that repeated interactions give rise to incentives that diﬀer fundamentally from isolated
interactions [54]. Thus, the collective manager employs oﬄine analysis of data provided by
participating nodes, partners, clients, and collective managers to determine future pay rates
for each node. Consistently desirable behavior leads to increased rewards, e.g., the pay rate
of nodes increases in response to predictable long term availability. Undesirable behavior
results in decreased rewards, e.g., the pay rate of nodes decreases in response to being caught
lying about work done in an attempt to receive undeserved compensation.
In Chapter 6, we analyze the impact of our incentive model from an economic standpoint
to derive key properties of our incentive system. We examine the impact of decisions made
by selﬁsh nodes and analyze the gain vs loss possibilities for participating nodes as we vary
the likelihood of bad actors being caught. We show that while we cannot prevent users from
being dishonest, our mechanisms mitigate dishonest behavior by making it economically
unattractive. We show that a small probability of catching cheaters (under 4%) is suﬃcient
for creating a successful deterrence against cheating. We further show that our incentive
system can be used successfully to motivate nodes to remain in the system for prolonged
durations.
3.5 Summary
This chapter has presented the overall design of a collective system. Especially it has de-
scribed the the architecture of the collective manager and the overall incentive system that
makes the core of a collective.
Many of the topics covered here are revisited in upcoming chapters in more detail. We
discuss the detailed design of two services - a collective content distribution service (CCDS)
in Chapter 4 and a collective backup service (CBS) in Chapter 5. Similarly the incentive
model is revisited in Chapter 6 and information aware scheduling is discussed in detail in
Chapter 7. Many of the implementation speciﬁc details are presented in Chapter 8.
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Collective Content Distribution
Service
Recently there has been an explosion in legal content distribution over the Internet, e.g., the
highly successful iPod and iTunes services. Many prognosticators predict that the Internet
will become the predominant means for audio and video distribution in the foreseeable future.
The typical infrastructure required to support such distribution (e.g. Apple’s iTune music
server) is a large dedicated cluster of web servers with tremendous external bandwidth. A
web-system that can support millions of downloads per day, especially of multi-gigabyte
videos, is an expensive operation in terms of both infrastructure and administrative costs.
We have designed and implemented a collective content distribution service (CCDS),
where the idle resources of myriad cheap network-connected computers distributed around
the world are harnessed to achieve that. CCDS distributes large content ﬁles (e.g., movies,
music, or software updates) to thousands of clients on behalf of its service partners. Typical
partners are content distributors, e.g., an online movie distribution company that utilize the
collective service for movie distribution, while managing the content acquisition and sales
itself. Figure 4.1 illustrates a typical collective content distribution network where clients
buy content from a content distributor and download it from a CCDS overlay.
4.1 Design
CCDS is managed by a service manager running on the CM, called the CCDS manager. The
CCDS manager builds a content overlay network using the storage and bandwidth resources
of participating nodes to cache and serve the data to the clients. Each participating node
runs a CCDS component called the CCDS agent to provide this service. CCDS agents are
run inside the VM allocated to the CM on the PNs.
4.1.1 Usage Overview
Clients have an application interface, e.g., something like the iTunes content download appli-
cation, that interacts directly with the content distributor for content browsing and purchase,
but uses CCDS for actual content download. To initiate a request the client software contacts
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the content distributor, and after proper authentication/payment obtains a small signed cer-
tiﬁcate with rights to download the content from the overlay, alongwith a list of related
participating nodes. The client then downloads the content directly from the participating
nodes, with diﬀerent chunks coming from diﬀerent nodes.
4.1.2 Control Flow
CCDS is a push-based service, where the content distributor pushes content to the CCDS
overlay, and then has clients download the content directly from the overlay. We anticipate
that a content distributor will typically push its most popular content to the CCDS overlay,
while serving the requests for odd content itself.
A content distributor interfaces with the CCDS manager, and can issue dynamic requests
to it to cache particular content on its overlay system. Content consists of a ﬁle or a set of
ﬁles usually in an encrypted form. The content distributor assigns a unique content ID to
each content and creates a metainfo ﬁle that can be used to digitally verify the correctness
of the content. Each content is logically divided into chunks of ﬁxed size (we use 512KB in
our prototype) and md5sum of each chunk is calculated to prepare the content’s metainfo.
To push a content into the CCDS, content distributor passes the associated metainfo to
the CCDS manager. Upon receiving the metainfo, the CCDS manager generates an initial
distribution pattern and informs the appropriate PNs to cache the relevant data. The CCDS
manager then provides content distributor with the caching map for the content. This map
is used by the content distributor to provide a list of PNs that clients should contact to
complete the download.
The CCDS manager ensures that the caching map used by the content distributor is kept
updated by pushing a revised map periodically, or when major reshuﬄing.
4.1.3 Content Caching
Once the CCDS manager gets a request from the content distributor to distribute a particular
content, it must decide a caching strategy for it. As part of this, the CCDS manager
selects a set of participating nodes, and distributes chunks of the content to them. A given
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departures/failures, and to improve aggregate available to the clients.
The CCDS manager uses a feedback-driven system where it adapts to changing demand
of the content as well as node departures or failures. To help in this, the content distributor
keeps track of recent purchases for a particular content, and periodically informs the CCDS
manager about the demand statistics for that content - e.g., 10 copies sold in last hour. The
CCDS manager uses this information to predict future demand, and ensures that data is
cached at enough places to meet the demand. Similarly node manager informs the CCDS
manager about any observed failures or departures among PNs used by the CCDS service.
The CCDS manager process this information and initiates new replicas if needed.
4.1.4 Authorization
The goal of our authorization system is two-fold: 1) to ensure that the only authorized
clients/nodes are able to download the content from CCDS and 2) to have a trail that
enables us to determine who downloaded from whom for resource accounting purposes.
After purchasing a song, a client gets a signed certiﬁcate (called a cauth) from the content
distributor. A cauth acts as an authorization to download the data from CCDS. A cauth
consists of a 4-tuple data signed using the private key of the content distributor. The cauth
data consists of {contentID, ckey, authID}. Here contentID represents the content that
was bought by the client. cKey is the client public key that identiﬁes the client that was
authorized to download the content. authID is the transaction ID for resource accounting
purposes. A client must provide the cauth certiﬁcate as part of the handshake protocol to
the PNs from which it is requesting a part of the data. PNs verify the authorization and
only provide the data if the client has the valid authorization.
Non-Repudiation:
To guard against certain cheating behaviors, we use a non-repudiation protocol for any
data transfer between PNs and clients. This ensures that when a PN sends data to the
client, the client can not deny receiving the data. That is, a PN receives a veriﬁable proof
whenever it provides certain data to the client.
Our protocol is directly based on oﬄine TTP (trusted third party) based protocol de-
scribed in [48]. A trusted third party (TTP) is said to be oﬄine if it is involved in the
protocol only in case of a incorrect behavior of a dishonest entity or in case of a network
error. As per this protocol, a sender sends ciphered data (Dk, i.e., D encrypted with cipher
k) to a receiver instead of the data D itself. The cipher key k is sent separately, only after
the receiver sends a signed proof of receipt of the data to the sender. To prevent a sender
from getting a proof of receipt and then not delivering the key k to the receiver, the sender
has to send the key k encrypted with public key of the TTP to the receiver along with the
data. So if the receiver does not get the key k, it contacts TTP with the key k encrypted
with the public key of TTP and a signed proof of the receipt of the data. In response, the
TTP decrypts the key k and sends it back to the receiver. In addition, the TTP sends the
proof of the receipt of the data to the sender. This is necessary, as the receiver can contact
the TTP directly without sending the signed proof of receipt of the data to the sender. Exact
details of the protocol can be seen in [48]. In our system, the CCDS service manager acts
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Connection ﬂow: We use transport layer security protocol (TLS) [22, 65] layered on top of
TCP as the basic communication channel between clients and nodes. As already mentioned
in the Section 3.3.1, each client and node in the system has a unique PKI certiﬁcate associated
with its identity. This certiﬁcate acts as the authentication proof during the TLS handshake.
Once authenticated, the requester needs to provide the necessary authorization certiﬁcate
(cauth) and only then the actual data transmission happens.
4.1.5 Digital Rights Mechanisms and CCDS
The CCDS service is a system to distribute/download content and as such does not sug-
gest any Digital Rights Mechanisms (DRM). Though it is possible to implement a content
distribution system with a DRM mechanism that uses CCDS for content distribution. For
example, it is possible to use the CCDS system to distribute content using the two most
prevalent DRM systems today, fairplay used by Apple’s Itune and Microsoft’s DRM sys-
tem [1].
In both the cases, a client interested in a particular content will download the data in
an encrypted format from the CCDS overlay, but will need to acquire the licenses from the
content distributor to decrypt the content before consuming it.
In the fairplay system the encrypted content and licensing information are represented
as a single ﬁle. The license keys are present in the starting block of the ﬁle. To achieve this
functionality using the CCDS system, the initial block of the ﬁle would be delivered directly
from the content distributor server. Rest of the ﬁle containing the encrypted content will be
downloaded from the CCDS overlay.
In the case of Microsoft’s DRM technology [1], the encrypted content and license keys
are already handled separately. A client will download the ﬁle from the CCDS overlay and
will then request the license information from the content distributor server.
4.2 CCDS Incentive Model
In this section we start by describe the contribution accounting system and then we present
how we deter cheating behaviors by participating nodes.
4.2.1 Accounting System
The accounting system is responsible for determining how much a PN should be paid based
on its contribution to the useful work. The core of the CCDS’s accounting system is an oﬄine
processing system that acts on the reports collected from the PNs and content distributor,
and on information available to the CCDS manager.
• PN’s Report: PNs periodically (e.g., every day) send reports to the CCDS manager
that detail the content they have distributed and to which clients. This report contains
the contentID, transaction ID, and speciﬁc chunk numbers that were delivered. It also
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proof of their contributions. PNs send this at a random time of the day to prevent
contacting CMs all at the same time.
• Content Distributor Report: The content distributor sends a log on what content
was sold to whom. It includes content ID, the client ID, and timestamp of the trans-
actions. This log also includes the list of the PNs that were speciﬁed to the client from
which to download the data.
• CCDS Manager Information: The CCDS service manager maintains the metainfo
ﬁle for contentID which can be used to determine the size of content, the number of
chunks into which it was divided, and corresponding chunk sizes.
The accounting system uses reports provided by PNs and the content distributor to
determine individual PN contributions. It organizes information based on transaction ID.
For each content sold it prepares the list of nodes involved and their declared contribution.
It veriﬁes the NORs sent by the PNs in their reports and removes any unveriﬁed contribution
records from the list (labeling nodes that provide such reports as cheater). Thus it prepares
a list of contributors for every content sold and compensates PNs accordingly.
4.2.2 Deterring Cheating Behaviors
To create a successful deterrent, any cheating behavior should be economically unattractive
to the participating nodes or should lead to detection and penalty for the cheating. Our use
of non-repudiation protocol provides a crucial help for this deterrence. As already mentioned,
all data transfer to clients employ a non-repudiation protocol. This ensures that a PN can
provide veriﬁable proof (i.e., non-repudiation of receipt, NOR) for all data delivered by it.
We can divide the possible cheating behaviors in three main categories: (i) single node
cheating behavior, (ii) single client cheating behavior, and (iii) collusion based cheating
behavior.
Single Client Cheating Behavior
A cheating client can not aﬀect the accounting system, because as part of the protocol it
must follow the non-repudiation protocol and deliver the right NORs.
Single Node Cheating Behavior
A cheating PN can try to increase its proﬁt by mis-reporting its actual contribution. However,
it can not generate the NORs necessary to verify the contribution and thus will be caught
easily by the CCDS manager.
Collusion
PNs can collude with each other and with clients. Collusion allows cheaters to confuse
the CMs by providing incorrect reports from multiple channels. We counteract this by
using service-speciﬁc information to make it economically un-attractive to collude. There
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colluding among themselves, and 3) clients and PNs colluding with each other.
If only clients collude with each other, they can not cause incorrect accounting because
they still need to issue NORs whenever they successfully receive content from any PN.
Similarly, if only PNs collude with each other, they can not generate any false NORs and
thus can not fool the accounting system. Thus, a set of colluding cheating clients or a set
of colluding cheating PNs can not lead to any incorrect accounting. If they try, they will be
detected and punished.
The only interesting case arises when clients and PNs collude with one another. A
cheating client or clients can provide unlimited false NORs to their fellow colluding PNs.
For example, a client can issue a false NOR for a chunk to colluding node A, even though it
downloaded that chunk from another node B.
Two mechanisms limit the value of such collusions: client download cost and random
scheduling. Since our target service is a paid download service, colluding PNs can receive
“extra” credit only for content purchased by a colluding client. The economic value of the
credit per download to the participating nodes is always less than the cost paid by their
buyer, as only a fraction of the proﬁt trickles back to the participating nodes.
Random scheduling limits the value of collusion even further. The CCDS service manager
divides content into multiple chunks and distributes these chunks to a random set of PNs.
Even for content bought by a colluding client, the colluding PNs can get credit only for those
parts of the content that they are scheduled to provide, which will likely be a small fraction
of the content. For collusion to be useful, it must include a very large percentage of the
nodes involved in the collective, including clients.
4.3 Summary
This chapter describes the design of a collective content distribution service. Given the
growing need of legal content distribution (e.g., paid songs, movies, and tv shows) over
the Internet, this service is a great ﬁt for utilizing the idle resources of end-nodes for a
commercially useful purpose.
The most important contribution of this chapter is the mix of security and economic
mechanisms designed as a core part of the service. This ensures the correct accounting of
individual nodes’ eﬀorts and creates a successful deterrence against cheating.
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Collective Backup Service
Collective backup system (CBS) is an distributed backup service build on top of our collective
system. Online backup is becoming an important service for millions of home and small
business communities that do not want to spend money on professional in-house backup
services.
CBS is a paid backup service that allows clients to store and retrieve data ﬁles over the
collective. All stored data is encrypted at the client computer before being submitted to
CBS. As in CCDS, from the client’s perspective, CBS appears to be a traditional client-
server solution. Clients do not have to be a participating node to use the service. Clients
use a small application to store and retrieve data and are charged based on their usage.
Figure 5.1 illustrates a typical collective backup service where clients interacts with a CBS
server as a front-end to service, while actual data is stored and retrieved from the collective
overlay in the background.
5.1 CBS Design
The main entities in CBS are the CBS server, the CM, participating nodes, and clients. The
CBS server provides the backup services to clients, and manage their login and accounting
details. The CBS is managed by a service manager running on the CM, called the CBS
manager. The CBS manager builds a storage network using the storage and bandwidth
resources of participating nodes to cache and serve data to the clients. Each participating
node runs a CBS component called the CBS agent to provide this service. CBS agents are
run inside the VM running on PNs.
5.1.1 Usage Overview
A client uses an application that allows it to easily backup a ﬁle on the CBS or to restore ﬁles
from the CBS. The CBS client app works like a typical ﬁle manager application and displays
a list of all ﬁles and directories stored by the client in the CBS. To backup a ﬁle, a user
starts by adding the ﬁle or directory to the CBS client app’s list of ﬁles being managed, e.g.,
through a drag-and-drop user interface. The client app then contacts the CBS manager and
uploads the data to appropriate nodes on the overlay. To restore/retrieve a ﬁle or directory,
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the client selects the particular ﬁle in the client app and a destination folder on the local
disk. The client app then downloads the requested ﬁle from the overlay and saves it in the
appropriate folder.
Clients are charged based on their actual usage of the service. There are service costs for
data storage as well as for data transfer. Data storage is measured as a function of data size
and the actual time that data was stored in the CBS. For example, storage of 3 GB of data
for a month on the overlay leads to charge of 3GB-Month. Data transfer costs are measured
based on actual amount of data transfered to/from the overlay. There can be diﬀerent rates
for data-in (store) and data-out (retrieval). PNs using this service can “pay” using credits
they receive for becoming a PN in the collective system (as an alternative to actual money
paid by normal clients).
One can also layer diﬀerent cost models over this basic service. For example, one can
package a backup service providing 5GB of storage with a ﬁxed monthly cost.
5.1.2 Content Caching
Given a data store request, the client app starts by creating a metainfo that will be used
to digitally verify the correctness of the data. Each ﬁle is logically divided into chunks of
ﬁxed size (we use 512KB in our prototype) and the md5sum of each chunk is calculated and
added to the data’s metainfo. The client app then contacts the the CBS manager to register
the data and passes the metainfo to the CBS manager. The CBS manager then assigns a
unique data ID for the data, and provides a list of PNs to which the client should upload the
data. Diﬀerent data chunks are assigned to diﬀerent PNs with diﬀerent data chunks going
to diﬀerent PNs. The client app then uploads the data to those nodes.
The CBS manager maintains a list of data ﬁles saved by a client and corresponding
metainfo. The client app can retrieve this information from the CBS manager by providing
appropriate authentication info. This authentication info is based on unique PKI certiﬁcate
associated with each client as described the Section 3.3.1. The CBS client app typically
keeps a locally cached copy of the user’s data’s metainfo and provides a GUI that lets the
user browse the list of ﬁles stored for the user in the CBS.
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app then contacts the CBS manager to retrieve a list of nodes storing copies of the data and
downloads the data directly from those nodes.
Each transfer employs a non-repudiation protocol similar to the one employed in CCDS,
so that both the sender and receiver can provide veriﬁable proof of the transfer. We use the
oﬄine trusted third party based non-repudiation scheme described in [48].
It is the responsibility of the CBS manager to ensure that data remains available even in
presence of node churnings, failures, and selﬁsh behaviors.
5.1.3 Durability
Durability is the most important concern when building a remote backup service out of
unreliable end-nodes. The CBS must ensure data durability even in the presence of node
failures and churning.
These problems have been studied extensively in projects like Ocenastore [66, 49], Total
Recall [10], Glacier [37], and Carbonite [19]. We use lessons learned in those systems in
the design of CBS. Similar to Oceanstore and Glacier, we employ both erasure coding and
replication to maintain durability [30]. That is, data chunks created through erasure coding
are further replicated on multiple nodes. We use the Cauchy Reed-Solomon code [12] for
erasure coding.
We use the PN historic availability data collected by the CM to decide the necessary
degree of replication and the erasure code ratio to use. These values are dependent on
typical node availability, node churning, and rate of permanent failures (e.g., due to disk
failures) observed by the system.
The CBS manager keeps track of permanently failed replicas, i.e., replicas no longer
available either due to disk failures or because of a PN permanently leaving the collective.
The CBS manager creates additional replicas at a rate roughly equal to the permanent
failure rate to ensure the durability of the data. There are two main ways that the CBS
uses to detect failures — active mode detection and passive mode detection. Passive mode
detection is achieved whenever the system notices failure as part of some other activity, e.g.,
a client trying to retrieve certain data. Active detection is based on periodic data checks
(e.g, once a month) to ensure that data stored on a PN is not lost. Data check involves the
act of successfully transfering data and verifying its correctness using a hash to ensure that
a node still possess a particular piece of data. Typically a node will be asked to transfer
only a randomly selected small portion of the data stored by it. These checks also serve the
additional purpose of ensuring safety against cheating behaviors (More details on cheating
detection are provided in Section 5.2.2).
5.2 CBS Incentive System
The goal of the CBS incentive system is to reward correct behavior by PNs supporting the
CBS service and to create a successful deterrent against cheating behaviors. In this section
we describe the mechanisms employed by the CBS to implement the incentive system. We
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for this purpose. We then follow it up with our mechanisms to deter cheating behaviors by
participating nodes.
5.2.1 Reports and Accounting
PN’s Report: Each participating node sends a periodic report to the CBS manager listing
the data it is storing, the time-frame of the storage, and a list of transfers in which it has
participated since the last report. It also appends the non-repudiation certiﬁcates for each
transfer.
CBS Manager Report: The accounting system gets a detailed history of the clients’
requests to the CBS manager for storage or recovery, and the corresponding list of the PNs
sent by the CBS manager.
With these reports, the CBS accounting system does oﬄine analysis to tabulate the
contributions of individual PNs. A participating node participates in two main activities:
storing data on its disk and transferring data to other nodes/clients for replication or recovery.
Thus, the CBS manager rewards each participating node in proportion to the data stored
over time and for the amount of data transferred.
In addition to the above reports, the CBS manager periodically does data checks to ensure
protection against cheating behaviors. These checks and their role in deterring cheating are
discussed in next subsection.
5.2.2 Deterring Cheating Behaviors
To discourage cheating behaviors, CBS must oﬀer incentives to PNs to behave according to
system-speciﬁed rules. Any cheating behavior should be economically unattractive to the
participating nodes, or should lead to detection and penalty for the cheating.
As a ﬁrst layer of protection, all data transferred between nodes, or between nodes and
clients, employ a non-repudiation protocol, thus creating a veriﬁable trail of who did what.
This accountability is crucial to ensure correct higher level functionality.
As a second layer of protection, each participating node must send periodic reports to
the CBS manager, as mentioned above. Each participating node is assigned a set of data
chunks to store. If a PN is found to have successfully received some particular data, but
then does not report it as part of its periodic report of data being stored, the CBS manager
penalizes the PN for wasting system bandwidth.
A third mechanism ensures correct data storage and detects any data deletion by cheating
PNs. To achieve this, the CBS manager performs periodic data checks (e.g., once in a month).
The data check involves the act of successfully transferring data from the PN to verify that
the PN still possesses a correct replica of the concerned data.
A node storing GBs of data does not have to transfer all of its data to prove its possession.
A node is asked to transfer only a randomly selected small portion of the data stored by
it. At ﬁrst glance these periodic data transfers may seem to be a big overhead, but we
observe that the CBS system must create additional replicas of the stored data continuously
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as the data possession checks for the nodes involved.
This work is managed by a component of CBS manager called veriﬁcation server. Veri-
ﬁcation server ensures that a periodic data check (e.g. once in month) is performed either
directly by it or indirectly with the help of other participating nodes. Depending on past
behavior, the veriﬁcation server can also turn to auditing mode where only a randomly se-
lected small percentage of PNs are veriﬁed every month.
5.2.3 Cheating Analysis
Single Node Cheating Behavior
A PN earns credit for data storage or data transfer. Thus, possible cheating behaviors
include misreporting the amount or duration of data stored or misreporting a data transfer.
A particularly cheating node may even delete the stored data and still try to get credit for
its storage.
Our non-repudiation protocol ensures that a PN can not misreport a data transfer. If
a PN does so, it will be caught and penalized. Additionally, a trail of valid data transfers
created by the non-repudiation protocol allows the CBS manager to correctly determine the
actual amount of data stored on a PN.
Also our non-repudiation protocol and periodic data checks ensure that a node retains
the data that has been transfered to it for storage or penalized for mis-reporting.
Single Client Cheating Behavior
A client can potentially initiate a data retrieval request even when it does not require that
particular data. This can lead to unnecessary use of system resources, especially bandwidth.
There is no mechanism to diﬀerentiate a valid retrieval request from a invalid request made
only for wasting system resources.
However, from the CBS perspective, this is not a problem. Clients are charged based on
actual usage, which includes both storage and data transfer costs. So clients are charged for
invalid requests as well and thus have a negative incentive to not waste CBS resources.
Collusion
PNs can either collude among themselves and/or with clients to increase their payments
beyond their fair share based on the actual work performed.
A colluding set of PNs can try to avoid storing data at a node if another node in the
set is also storing the same data. They can acheive this by using a reﬂection mechanism to
pass periodic data checks. That is, given a data check request, a colluding PN can pass the
query to another colluding node with the data and supply the returned reply to the checker.
Though given a small set of colluding nodes, it should be rare for colluding PNs to share
replicas, which mitigates the storage savings acheived by colluders.
A second case involves a mix of colluding clients and PNs. Here, colluding clients can
try to invoke data recovery operations again and again, with a goal of getting extra transfer
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pay for each data transfer from the system. The CBS credit system is designed in such a
way that eventual credits rewarded to PNs for a work is less than or equal to the proﬁt made
by the system for that work. Additionally as in the above case, the possibility of colluding
PNs having the backup data owned by the colluding client is very low. The CBS manager
ensures that any give data storage request is fulﬁlled by randomly chosen nodes, minimizing
inter-storage of data by a small set of colluding nodes.
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Economic Analysis
In this chapter we evaluate our incentive model from an economic standpoint to derive key
properties of our incentive system. In particular, we use game theory and probabilistic
analysis to gain better insight into the implications of our design choices. We examine the
impact of decisions made by selﬁsh nodes and analyze the gain vs loss possibilities for cheaters
as we vary the likelihood of cheaters being caught. We show that while we cannot prevent
users from cheating, our mechanisms mitigate cheating behavior by making it economically
unattractive. We show that a small probability of catching cheaters (under 4%) is suﬃcient
for creating a successful deterrence against cheating. We further show that our incentive
system can be used successfully to motivate nodes to remain in the system for prolonged
durations.
6.1 Analytical Model of the Incentive System
Our economic analysis focuses on the two main entities in our system, collective managers
and participating nodes. Participating nodes are assumed to be self interested, rational
parties, which from a game theory standpoint means that they act in ways that maximize
their long term ﬁnancial gain even if this involves cheating. A collective manager is a trusted
party that manages the resources of participating nodes to support commercial services. Its
goal is to build a successful business providing services to external customers using its PNs’
resources.
In game theory, systems are modeled as games played between players. Players are
faced with a series of options from which they must choose. The outcome of each game
(choice) depends on the player’s choice and the choice(s) made by their opponent(s). The
most famous example of game theory is the Prisoner’s Dilemma [38], where two prisoners
who are both accused of a crime are separated and individually given the option of either
“cooperating” (staying silent) or “defecting” (confessing to the crime and testifying against
the other prisoner). If both prisoners stay silent, they receive a 6-month sentence. If both
prisoners defect, they both receive a 5-year sentence. If one prisoner cooperates and the
other defects, the one who defects is set free, while the one who cooperates is given 10-year
sentence. In a variant of the game where the players play the game repeatedly, researchers
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sentences [38]. We exploit this phenomenon in our incentive model.
We model the interaction between participating nodes and the collective manager using a
basic game theoretic utility model. At any given time, we present PNs with two orthogonal
choices: (i) should they remain in the collective or not and (ii) should they report the correct
amount of work for the last reporting period or attempt to claim they did more work than
they did to receive a higher (undeserved) payment from the CM. In this game at any time
slot s, a rational PN node can either choose to share or not share its resources based on
the expected reward of each choice. We can represent the choices available to PNs and
the collective manager using simple tables like Tables 6.1-6.4. Each column represents the
options available to the collective manager and each row represents the options available to
a PN. Entries in table take the form a/b where a is the payoﬀ (reward) for the row player
(i.e., PN) and b is the payoﬀ for the column player (CM). In a typical game theory situation,
the two players make simultaneous decisions, but in our scenario PNs make their decision
(share, no share) and then CMs make their decision (reward or not reward the PN).
The “games” played as a part of collective are non zero-sum games, meaning that one
player’s gain is not necessarily another player’s loss (and vice versa). PNs are not assumed
to be altruistic, but rather we want to derive an incentive model where it is in each node’s
rational self-interest to cooperate. In other words, it is our goal to design rules for the “game”
such that rational actors will ﬁnd cheating economically unattractive. In the remainder of
this section, we consider diﬀerent scenarios and determine whether the outcome realized
achieves this goal.
6.1.1 Perfect Monitoring
We start by assuming a perfect monitoring scenario, i.e., the collective manager has perfect
information about the contributions made by PNs it manages. In this case a PN cannot
successfully lie to a CM about how much work it performs, because if they lie, they are
guaranteed to be caught.
Table 6.1 shows the payoﬀ structure for this scenario. A dash means that a particular
case is not possible in this scenario, e.g., it is not possible for a PN to choose “Not Share” and
have the CM choose to “Reward” it. Assuming a CM shares its income 50%-50% between
itself and the PN concerned, we get the value of GS/GS for the PN share case. This means
that if a PN share its resources, noth it and the CM receive GS beneﬁt. Here GS is a positive
number, which denotes the gain (payoﬀ) received for sharing.
Reward No Reward
Share GS/GS -
Not Share - 0/0
Table 6.1: Payoﬀs for Perfect Monitoring Case
If we apply standard game theory analysis to this utility table, both (share/reward) and
(no-share/no-reward) are Nash equilibrium [38]. Informally, a strategy is a Nash equilib-
rium if no player can do better by unilaterally changing his or her strategy. Even though
38(share/reward) is pareto optimal, meaning that it leads to both players receiving their highest
reward, both cases are equally possible from a Nash equilibrium point of view.
This analysis assumes that both players choose their actions independently, which as we
mentioned above is not the case in our design. In our case, a CM makes its choice only
after analyzing the action of the PN concerned, which is why the two dashed states are not
possible. Hence, a PN knows that the CM will always choose reward in response to share,
which tilts the equilibrium balance towards (share/reward) instead of (no-share/no-reward).
This behavior of the collective manager greatly simpliﬁes our analysis of the various scenarios
discussed throughout the paper and leads to pareto optimal choices for rational PNs.
Cost of Sharing: Table 6.1 does not model the fact that there is a cost associated with
performing a job (e.g., power charges). Let c be the cost of performing a job, which typically
will be small since we are exploiting idle resources, but positive. Table 6.2 shows a modiﬁed
reward structure that accounts for this cost.
Reward No Reward
Share (GS − c)/GS -
Not Share - 0/0
Table 6.2: Payoﬀs for Perfect Monitoring Case with cost of sharing included
6.1.2 Imperfect Monitoring
The previous analysis assumes that the CM has perfect knowledge regarding whether a PN
is accurately reporting how much work it performs. Table 6.3 shows a payoﬀ table if we
assume that a CM can only detect PN lies with some non-zero probability. Here c continues
to represent the cost for a PN to perform a unit of work. Rational PNs now have an additional
choice available to them; they can chose to lie to the CM, claiming to do work that they
have not done. Gcheat is the expected reward that a PN will receive if it lies, and L is the
loss incurred by the CM due to incorrect awarding of credits. If the system cannot detect
lies, then Gcheat is equal to GS, in which case a rational PN will always lie, since this lets it
receive a reward without doing any work. Thus, if CMs cannot detect lying PNs, the system
will destabilize since cheating PNs will always claim to do work, but not do it.
Reward No Reward
Share (GS − c)/GS -
Cheat Gcheat/ − L -
Not Share - 0/0
Table 6.3: Payoﬀs for Imperfect Monitoring Case
Our collective service is designed to make it nearly impossible for PNs to successful lie
about their contributions. However, it is impractical to track enough information to catch
all instances of a PN lying. If we assume that only a fraction of all lies will be detected,
we can analyze the impact of undetected lies to determine what probability of lie detection
39is necessary to motivate selﬁsh PNs to report the truth. Assume that the probability of
detecting a lie (oﬀense) is po. In that case, the expected payoﬀ for lying (Gcheat) is:
Gcheat = (1 − po) ∗ GS
We can create a deterrent that punishes PNs when they are caught cheating, i.e., when
they provide incorrect accounting information. If F is the amount we penalize PNs when we
catch them lying, the expected payoﬀ for lying (Gcheat) becomes:
Gcheat = (1 − po) ∗ GS + po ∗ −F
We can represent F as a certain fraction of GS, i.e., a PN is penalized a fraction (deﬁned as
b) of pay for each unit of work it falsely claims to have done. Adding this penalty results in
an expected reward for lying (Gcheat) as:
F = b ∗ GS where b > 0
Gcheat = (1 − po) ∗ GS − po ∗ b ∗ GS
Gcheat = GS ∗ (1 − po − po ∗ b)
This results in the payoﬀ table shown in Table 6.4:
Reward No Reward
Share (GS − c)/GS -
Lie GS ∗ (1 − po − po ∗ b)/ − L -
Table 6.4: Payoﬀs for Imperfect Monitoring with Penalties
Figure 6.1.2 plots possible payoﬀ for a single unit of reward (GS = 1) as a function
of po, the probability of being caught. Diﬀerent curves in the graph represent the payoﬀ
for diﬀerent values of b, i.e., diﬀerent sized penalties relative to the standard reward. We
observe that the potential payoﬀ of lying drops below zero when the probability of being
caught crosses a threshold that depends on b. Speciﬁcally, we can derive Gcheat < 0 as
follows:
GS ∗ (1 − po − po ∗ b) < 0 =⇒ po >
1
1 + b
So for b = 1, a probability of 0.5 or more is required to make fake sharing economically
uninteresting to a user. A collective manager can eﬀectively use diﬀerent values of b to
create diﬀerent degrees of deterrence.
6.1.3 Variable Pay Rates
In the previous analysis, we considered only single-round games. However, in our system,
PNs typical participate in a series of games, which lets us employ the game theory of repeated
interactions [38] to analyze the impact of repeated interactions on the behavior of PNs.
A simple solution treats repeated interactions as independent, using the rules presented
in earlier sections. In this case, we can use the sum of the individual round payoﬀs to
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Figure 6.1: Expected Pay vs Probability of Being Caught
understand the dynamics of repeated interactions. However, this approach does not exploit
our ability to employ a variable pay rate mechanism that responds to observed PN behavior
to motivate rational PNs to cooperate. We use pay variability to acheieve two types of
positive behaviors from PNs: (i) to encourage nodes to remain in the collective for extended,
predictable periods and (ii) to punish cheaters.
To address our ﬁrst goal, that of encouraging nodes to remain in the collective for ex-
tended periods, the amount of payment that a node receives in return for work is varied
depending on its long term “consistency”. A node that remains in the CM’s pool for long
periods of time and that provides continuous predictable performance receives more credit
for a unit of work than a node that ﬂits in and out of the CM’s pool.
In our design, pay rates(R) are divided into l levels, (R1,R2,...Rl), whereby each pay
rate is a ﬁxed constant above/below the level below/above it, as follows:
Rn = R1 + I ∗ (n − 1)Rn <= Rl (6.1)
PNs enter the system at the lowest pay rate (R1); a node’s pay rate increases as it demon-
strates stable consistent contributions to the collective. If a node contributes successfully to
collective for Traise consecutive time periods, its pay rate is increased. Periods during which
no work is scheduled on a node are not counted for this calculation. The number of levels
(l), initial pay rate (R1), pay rate increment (I), and eﬀort needed to warrant a raise (Traise)
are conﬁgurable parameters for a given service, and are dependent on the proﬁt margins of
the service.
41To discourage cheating, the system can apply a pay cut when it identiﬁes a node mis-
reporting the amount of work it performs. When such an oﬀense is detected, the PN’s pay
rate is reduced by the amount of pay increases that would normally accrue for Tcut steps
(periods) of useful work. Typically Tcut is a multiple of Traise (i.e., Tcut = o ∗ Traise where
o ≥ 1), so pay is dropped by some conﬁgurable number of pay levels. The size of the pay cut
(Tcut) can be conﬁgured on a per-service basis, depending upon the criticality of the oﬀense
committed.
We can represent a PN’s pay rate at any time t as R(t):
R(t) = R1 + I ∗
t1
Traise
− Ndetected ∗ I ∗
Tcut
Traise
Here t1 represents the number of timeslots where some useful work was performed or claimed
to have been performed and the lie went undetected. After time t1, a node will receive
I ∗ t1/Traise pay increases. Ndetected represents the number of detected oﬀenses; each such
oﬀense leads to a decrease in pay rate equivalent to Tcut steps.
6.2 Evaluating the Incentive Model
Let us use this model to analyze the accumulated payoﬀs for diﬀerent node proﬁles to un-
derstand how our mechanisms aﬀect node behavior.
Short Lived vs Long Lived Nodes
To analyze the diﬀerence between short-lived and long-lived players, we plot the average pay
rate received by diﬀerent honest nodes of similar capabilities with diﬀerent active life times in
the system. We assume R1 = 1, a sample increment of 0.2 with 10 levels and Traise = 7 (e.g.,
7 days). Figure 6.2 plots the average payrate vs the life of a player in the system. This graph
clearly shows that patient long-lived players gain clear advantage over short-lived players.
Deterring Cheating Behavior
A rational node will cheat only if the gain from cheating is more than that of honest behavior.
Earlier we discussed the expected gain for a single unit of the work. Here we discuss the
expected gain for a series of interactions.
A PN that performs work on behalf of a collective can complete only a limited amount of
work per time unit given its available resources. In comparison, a cheating PN can fake the
completion of an almost unbounded amount of work, irrespective of its resource capabilities.
In this section we analyze the expected accumulated gain of a node over a period of time
of n time periods, e.g., n days (we use summation of gain over t from 1 to n to show this).
We consider two scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario nodes behave honestly, while in the second
scenario nodes claim to complete more work than they really performed (i.e., they cheat).
Let Ghonest be the expected gain of behaving honestly and Gcheat be the expected gain of
cheating. If Gcheat is more than Ghonest, then a rational node will always take the cheating
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Figure 6.2: Short Lived vs Long Lived Player
route to maximize its gain. We can represent the diﬀerence between Gcheat and Ghonest by
D:
D = Gcheat − Ghonest
To remain eﬀective in the face of cheating nodes,D should be less than zero in our system.
We can divide a node’s oﬀenses1 (lies about work done) into two categories, detected
oﬀenses and undetected oﬀenses. As explained in previous sections, a detected oﬀense not
only leads to a ﬁne but also impacts a node’s pay rate. Here we analyze the accumulated
reward of a cheating node over a period of time to understand the long term impact of
cheating.
We ﬁrst consider the case of perfect monitoring where every oﬀense is successfully detected
by the CM. Since every oﬀense is detected, a cheater will suﬀer a penalty for every oﬀense.
Ghonest =
n X
t=1
Nactual ∗ R(t)
Gcheat =
n X
t=1
Nactual ∗ R(t) − Noff ∗ F
Here Nactual represents the number of units of work per unit of time that the node can
perform given its available resources, and Noff represents the number of units of work faked
by a cheating node.
1We use the term oﬀense to denote instances when a node attempts to cheat the system. This choice of
terms is motivated by the fact that the following analysis is derived from the game theory associated with
criminal law, where oﬀenses refer to crimes [9, 62].
43po Probability of detecting oﬀenses
R(t) Pay Rate at time period t
b ﬁne ratio, Fine = b ∗ R(t)
Noﬀ Number of oﬀenses per time period
Nactual Number of work units that can be completed
by an honest node per time period
Traise Time periods required for a pay raise
Tcut Time period equivalent to a pay
rate cut for an oﬀense
o Ratio of pay cut rate to pay raise rate
(Tcut = o ∗ Traise)
I Pay raise increment
Ntotal Total number of oﬀenses committed =
Pn
t=1 Noﬀ(t)
l Number of Levels (max pay rate = Rl)
Table 6.5: Glossary of Mathematical Symbols Used
If the cheating node commits one (detected) oﬀense in every time slot, it will always be
paid at or below the base pay rate, R1. Eﬀectively,
Gcheat ≤
n X
t=1
Nactual ∗ R1 − Noff ∗ F,
where F is the ﬁne levied by a CM upon detecting an oﬀense. In this case, Gcheat > Ghonest,
so cheating is not economically attractive. Even when nodes only cheat once in a while, the
ﬁne and lower pay rate lead to less net income than honest nodes, which is unsurprising
given the assumption of perfect monitoring.
In case of imperfect monitoring, the system does not detect all oﬀenses. Let po be the
probability that a oﬀense is successfully detected by the CM. In this case, the accumulated
gain over a period of time depends upon the distribution over time of oﬀenses performed by
the node.
We ﬁrst consider a case where a node performs Noff oﬀenses during every time period
(e.g., every day). Given Noff oﬀenses in a time period, each having a probability of detection
of po, we can represent the probability of all oﬀenses going undetected by pndo. pndo is the
cumulative probability that none of Noff oﬀenses is detected, which is (1 − po)Noff. Given
pndo, we can estimate the pay rate at any time interval using the following equation:
pndo = (1 − po)
Noff
R(t) = R(t − 1) − po ∗ Noff ∗ o ∗ I + pndo ∗
I
Traise
Here po ∗ Noff represents the expected number of detected oﬀenses. Each detected oﬀense
leads to pay rate cut equivalent to o ∗ I. Note that R(t) is capped at Rl.
We can represent the accumulated gain of a cheating node, Gcheat, as follows:
SU = (1 − po) ∗ Noff + Nactual
Gcheat =
n X
t=1
SU ∗ R(t) − po ∗ Noff ∗ F
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Figure 6.3: D for Diﬀerent Number of Oﬀenses
Here SU represents the number of units of work successfully billed by a PN, which includes
both real work and undetected falsely claimed work. F represents the ﬁne for a detected
oﬀense, which we represent as a multiple of the equivalent reward for performing a unit of
work, i.e., F = b ∗ R(t) where b > 0
To visualize the implication of these equations, let us consider the case of accumulated
gain over a period of 25 days, where each time slot is one day. We use R1 = 0.1 (initial pay
rate), a sample increment of 0.02 (pay increase per day of sustained honest operation) with
10 levels, Traise = 7, Tcut = 7, Nactual = 50, and F = 1 ∗ R(t). In Figure 6.3 we plot D, the
diﬀerence between the accumulated gain of cheating and genuine node as we vary Noff from
1 to 25.
The results make clear that increasing the probability of detecting oﬀenses leads to a
very sharp decrease in the value of D. If po is 0 meaning no oﬀenses are ever detected,
D is positive and increases with each oﬀense, so nodes are motivated to cheat. However,
D quickly becomes negative for po values of 0.05, 0.1 and 0.15. Thus rational nodes will
determine that it is in their own best interest to not cheat even when the chance of being
caught is small, and the disincentive to cheat increases as the number of oﬀenses increases.
As an alternative to ﬁning and reducing the pay rate of PNs when the CM catches them
lying about work performed, we could simply ban users found to commit an oﬀense. Our
approach warns misbehaving nodes to mend their ways, and rational nodes will realize that
there is no beneﬁt from cheating and cooperate. If individual nodes persist in misbehaving,
their pay rate will soon turn negative (due to cuts), which for practical purposes is as eﬀective
as banning the node.
45Worst Case Analysis
In this section we investigate the maximum expected beneﬁt (Dmax) that a dishonest node
can gain from cheating. We can divide the gain/loss from cheating into three categories: (i)
the payoﬀ from undetected cheating (Gcheat), (ii) the loss due to ﬁnes for detected cheating
(Lfines), and (iii) the losses accrued from receiving a pay cut due to detected cheating
(Lpaycut).
Dmax = Gcheat − Lfines − Lpaycut
Given a particular ﬁne, F = b ∗ R(t), we can estimate Gcheat and Lfines using the following
equations:
Gcheat =
n X
t=1
Noff(t) ∗ (1 − po) ∗ R(t)
Lfines =
n X
t=1
Noff(t) ∗ po ∗ b ∗ R(t)
Gcheat − Lfines =
n X
t=1
R(t)Noff(t) ∗ (1 − (b + 1)po)
The maximum value of R(t) is Rl, which we can use to reﬁne our estimate as follows:
Gcheat − Lfines ≤
n X
t=1
RlNoff(t) ∗ (1 − (b + 1)po)
Gcheat − Lfines ≤ Rl ∗ (1 − (b + 1)po) ∗
n X
t=1
Noff(t)
Gcheat − Lfines ≤ Rl ∗ (1 − (b + 1)po)Ntotal
Here Ntotal is the total number of oﬀenses over the time period and Noff(t) represents the
number of units of work faked by a cheating node for time slot t .
When a PN is caught cheating, its pay rate is decreased in addition to it receiving a ﬁne,
which decreases how much it receives for work it actually performs. Since the max pay rate
is capped at Rl, the impact of a pay cut persists only until a PN’s pay rate recovers to Rl,
which occurs if it is honest or not caught cheating for a period of time. Thus, the impact of
pay cuts is minimized when pay raises are frequent. If we assume that all cheating occurs
when a PN’s pay rate is Rl, we can calculate the minimum loss induced by being caught
cheating.
Assume that cheaters receive a pay rate cut of Tcut = o ∗ Traise. In other words, being
caught cheating reduces a PN’s pay rate by the equivalent of o pay raises. In this case,
we can calculate the loss a PN suﬀers due to the decreased pay rate from a single detected
46cheating event (Ls−paycut) as follows:
Ls−paycut ≥
o X
k=1
Nactual ∗ PayRateCut(k)
Ls−paycut ≥
o X
k=1
Nactual ∗ k ∗ Traise ∗ I
Ls−paycut ≥
o(o + 1)
2
∗ Traise ∗ Nactual ∗ I
The total number of expected detected oﬀenses can be calculated as po ∗ Ntotal. Using
this, we can reﬁne the previous equation to ﬁnd Lpaycut:
Lpaycut ≥
o(o + 1)
2
∗ Traise ∗ Nactual ∗ I ∗ po ∗ Ntotal
This lets us calculate Dmax as follows:
Dmax = Gcheat − Lfines − Lpaycut
Dmax ≤ Rl ∗ (1 − (b + 1)po)Ntotal
−
o(o+1)
2 Traise ∗ Nactual ∗ I ∗ po ∗ Ntotal
A rational node is motivated to cheat only if the gain from cheating is more than the
gain from behaving honestly. For our variable pay system to deter cheating, we should
select system paramaters to ensure that Dmax is negative. Using the above equation, we can
determine what conditions are necessary for Dmax to be negative as follows:
po >
Rl
Rl(b + 1) +
o(o+1)
2 Traise ∗ Nactual ∗ I
At ﬁrst glance, this formula might appear complicated, but we can gain some intuition
by solving it for a sample case. If we use the same parameters that were used for Figure 6.3
(1-day time slots, a pay scale with 10 levels that increases 20% per Traise = 7 days, a
pay decrease when caught cheating equal to Tcut = 7 days worth of raises, Nactual = 50,
R1 = 0.1, I = 0.02, and b = 1), we need only detect cheaters with a probability po greater
than 3
76 = 0.0395 (roughly 4.0%). This probability remains unchanged for diﬀerent values
of R1 as long as pay raise increment (I) is 20% of R1. In contrast, if we assess ﬁnes, but
not pay decreases, when a PN is caught cheating (the model derived in Section 6.1.2), the
probability po of catching a cheater must be greater than 0.5 to build an eﬀective deterrent.
Thus, varying pay based on longevity and honesty is an important feature for our incentive
model.
System Tuning
Even if we are unable to identify a cheating PN, the CM can obtain an estimate of the fre-
quency of cheating in the system using service-level information. For example, in a collective
content distribution system, clients will retry unsuccessful downloads using a diﬀerent PN,
47which will lead to multiple PNs requesting credit for same work if the ﬁrst failure was due to
a cheating PN. If a CM observes a particular frequency of undetected cheating, it can tune
the parameters used to calculate pay rates and ﬁnes (e.g., the ﬁne ratio b, the pay cut ratio
o, the rate of pay increases Traise, and the pay rate increment I) to maintain an acceptable
proﬁt margin.
6.3 Summary
Our analysis focused on two important challenges: (a) ensuring prolonged participation by
nodes in the collective and (b) discouraging dishonest behavior. An analysis of the economic
underpinnings of the system allowed us to gain important insights into the likely behavior
of diﬀerent players in the system, which we used to derive an incentive model that achieves
our goals.
The most important contribution of this chapter is to demonstrate how a mix of rewards
and punishments can be used to successfully motivate PNs to behave in ways that beneﬁt the
collective. We have also shown that a real system can sustain proﬁtability even in presence
of undetected oﬀenses or deviations from the desired behavior, as long as we are able to
detect as few as 4%-5% of dishonest behaviors.
48Chapter 7
Information Aware Scheduling
End-nodes go up and down in unpredictable ways and have diﬀerent compute and communi-
cation capabilities. Due to this unreliability and the heterogeneity of end-nodes’ resources,
it is diﬃcult to provide consistent service to clients. However this problem can be made
tractable by understanding and exploiting the underlying diversity to our advantage.
In this chapter, we focus on three important challenges: 1) unreliability inherent in the
system due to node churn, 2) resource heterogeneity among participating nodes, and 3)
changing resource demands of a service. We describe and analyze how a collective system
addresses these challenges using a mix of information aware and adaptive strategies. We use
a discrete event based simulator to investigate diﬀerent options and present our results in
this chapter.
Our analysis in this chapter leads us to the following insights regarding how to design
an eﬃcient scheduling system for a collective. First, analysis of nodes’ past behavior can
provide interesting clues to the scheduler that it can use to improve overall performance.
Nodes’ historic availability, bandwidth, and network location can be used as an important
aid for scheduling decisions. Second, live observation of system behavior can be used to
adapt services dynamically, which is important to ensure good service performance.
We do not focus on detailed scheduling algorithms in this Chapter as that is not the focus
of this thesis. Instead we focus on the unique opportunities made possible by collective model
and their contribution in improving service performance and in ensuring eﬀective resource
utilization. These contributions need to be viewed in the context of resource scheduling
strategies used in existing systems built for exploiting idle resources of end-nodes. For
example, systems like bitTorrent or Kazaa do not even have the capability to schedule job at
will on participating nodes. In these P2P systems, the resource scheduling is done as a side-
eﬀect of participating nodes’ users personal choices, e.g., user A is interested in downloading
movie ’foo’ and so on. In contrast, a collective system provides a platform where scheduling
can be based on service requirements, participating nodes’ resource capabilities, and an
informed understanding of historical and live system behavior.
This chapter is organized as follows. We describe a information aware scheduling system
for collectives in Section 7.1. We then describe our trace-based evaluation environment in
Section 7.2. We follow that up with simulation-based experiments that analyze the impact
of history-aware scheduling strategies in Section 7.3. We then analyze diﬀerent reactive
scheduling strategies and their impact on performance in Section 7.4. We discuss network-
49aware scheduling strategies in Section 7.5 and eﬀective utilization of end-nodes’ resources in
Section 7.6. Finally in Section 7.7 we summarize.
7.1 Overview
The goal of information aware scheduling is to utilize the diverse information available in
the system for eﬃcient scheduling of resources. Given a large enough set of nodes, diﬀerent
nodes bring diﬀerent capabilities with them. Some have high bandwidth pipes, while others
have signiﬁcant available storage. Similarly diﬀerent nodes stay online or oﬄine in diﬀerent
ways. An intelligent understanding of each node’s behavior and capabilities can be used
strategically to mitigate the problems that arises from the unreliability and heterogeneity of
end-nodes.
Our ﬁrst level of defense against node churning is the collective incentive model. As
described in Chapter 6, the collective incentive model employs a variable pay rate system
to reward consistency of nodes’ contribution. This motivates nodes to stay in the system
for prolonged durations. Thus, compared to traditional p2p systems, nodes in a collective
system have clear incentive to stay online for long durations and infrequent churning. In
a typical p2p system, most node churning occurs due to short-lived participants who are
active only to download a particular song and then go oﬄine. Thus we expect a more stable
environment in a collective system than is typical for a traditional p2p system.
Information aware scheduling provides the next level of defense against the unreliability
in the system. Two core concepts here - information and adaptation. That is, a collective
manager tracks signiﬁcant historic and live information, e.g., participating nodes’ resource
proﬁles, their past performance, service demand rates, dishonest behaviors etc. This diverse
information is then used to make informed scheduling decisions, i.e., the system is tuned
according to its own inherent characteristics. We believe that such an approach is crucial
in exploiting the inherent diversity in a collective to its advantage. The core of information
aware scheduling is built on top of following ideas:
• Division and Replication: The basic scheduling approach of a collective manager is
based on division and replication. A service is divided into multiple components and
then these components are replicated on multiple participating nodes in the system to
achieve the desired behavior. For example, in CCDS a given content is divided into
multiple chunks and these chunks are then replicated on one or more nodes.
• History-Aware Scheduling: The collective scheduler keeps track of each partic-
ipating node’s past performance records (e.g., upload bandwidth and online-oﬄine
patterns) and this information to make informed scheduling decisions. For example, a
given degree of required availability can be achieved with fewer of nodes if they stay
online consistently.
• Reactive Scheduling: Reactive scheduling focuses on taking immediate actions based
on observed dynamic behaviors. These actions lead to adaptive scheduling of resources
to ﬁt changing circumstances. For example, a reactive scheduler tracks client demand
50rate of a cached content and increases or decreases the degree of caching of the content
accordingly to ﬁt the service needs.
• Network-Aware Scheduling: Network-aware scheduling focuses on utilizing knowl-
edge about the network characteristics of participating nodes to improve scheduling.
For example, given a client request for an object, we can fulﬁll it by selecting a random
replica or we can select a replica based on the network location of replicas with respect
to the client.
• Multiple Tasks on a Node: Assigning only a single task on a node leads to un-
derutilization of node’s resources if that task is not active all the time or if the task
require only a subset of available resources. Thus in a collective, we assign multiple
tasks on a participating node. The collective manager provides a high level guidance to
a PN which in turn does local scheduling to share available resources between multiple
competing services.
We explore above methodologies in details during rest of this chapter.
7.2 Simulation Environment
We use a custom discrete event simulator to analyze the behavior of a collective system under
diﬀerent node churning patterns. We primarily use two diﬀerent traces of real-life systems
as a representative environment for evaluation.
Our ﬁrst trace is based on a Microsoft PC trace taken by Bolosky et al [13]. For this
trace, 51662 desktop PCs within Microsoft corporation were pinged every hour for 35 days
beginning July 6, 1999. We use the ﬁrst 10000 nodes from this data set as our ﬁrst trace.
Our second trace is based on a Skype superPeers trace provided by Guha et al [36]. For this
trace, a set of 2182 nodes participating in the Skype superpeer network were pinged (at the
application-level) every 30 minutes for one month beginning sep 12, 2005.
Apart from above traces, we also use synthetic traces of node churn to help make some
underlying trends more visible.
Performance metrics: We use diﬀerent performance metrics for diﬀerent experiments,
but there are two metrics that are used repeatedly: availability and available bandwidth.
• Availability: Availability is a measure of how many replicas of a particular data object
are active at any instant of time and whether it is possible to retrieve the complete
data object from the collective overlay or not.
In our system, a typical piece of content is divided into multiple chunks that are
distributed across diﬀerent nodes. Because individual nodes exhibit diﬀerent churn
and failure patterns, we get diﬀerent availability (i.e., number of accessible replicas)
for diﬀerent chunks at any instant of time. The availability of a piece of content
is calculated as the number of accessible replicas for its least available chunk. For
example, if a piece of content is divided into 4 chunks with the ﬁrst chunk having 3
accessible replicas, the second and third chunk having 5 accessible replicas, and the
fourth chunk having 2 replicas – the content availability is 2. If the availability drops
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Figure 7.1: Online Nodes in the System vs Time
below 1, then at that instant of time it is not possible to download a complete copy of
the content from the overlay.
• Available Bandwidth: Available bandwidth measures the total achievable band-
width for the delivery of a particular piece of content at any instant of time.
7.3 History Aware Scheduling
History-aware scheduling utilizes historical data available from diverse sources in the system
to understand the underlying system characteristics. For example, an analysis of participat-
ing nodes’ past availability and resource proﬁles (e.g., network bandwidth records) provides
important clues to the scheduler that can be used for making informed scheduling decisions.
As an example, Figure 7.1(a) shows the total number of active nodes in the system
over the entire 35 days of the Microsoft PC trace. One can easily make a few important
observations from this graph. First, the number of active nodes at a time never drops below
6466. Second, one can observe a periodic dip in the number of available nodes. For example,
the large dips occur every seven days and persist for around 2 days and then rise for around
ﬁve days. This weekly cycle seems to coincide with weekends when many employees may be
switching oﬀ their computers. Similarly, Figure 7.1(b) shows a similar graph of number of
active nodes for the 2081-node Skype Superpeer Network [36]. Here the number of active
nodes at any moment in time is always less than 935 (out of a total of 2081) and remains
more than 530 for most of the time. Understanding such phenomena is crucial for the CM
as it leads to a realistic understanding of aggregate system capabilities and can be utilized
to make informed scheduling decisions.
In this section, we experimentally evaluate diﬀerent scenarios that depict the opportu-
nity to make better scheduling decisions by analyzing historical data. We focus on three
categories of scheduling strategies that utilize history information. We start with availabil-
ity aware scheduling in subsection 7.3.1. We then present bandwidth aware scheduling in
Subsection 7.3.2. Finally, we discuss shift work scheduling in Subsection 7.3.3.
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Figure 7.2: Data Availability: Random vs Smart Selection (Microsoft Trace)
7.3.1 Availability Aware Scheduling
A system made up of end-nodes distributed across the Internet experiences node churn that
aﬀects the performance of distributed services built on top of it. An Availability aware
scheduling strategy provides a mechanism to manage this problem.
Given a task, the collective manager divides the task into multiple components and then
schedules these components on a set of participating nodes. An easy way to select this set
is to choose nodes randomly from the available pool. However, a better outcome can be
achieved if node selection is based on historic availability information. For example, a given
level of availability can be achieved with fewer nodes if the selected set of nodes remain
online for most of the time.
To explore the impact of node churn, we simulate the life-cycle of a data object cached on
nodes selected from Microsoft and Skype Traces. For this experiment, the data object is of
size 250 MB, divided into 10 MB chunks (i.e., total 25 chunks), and each chunk is replicated
on four nodes. Thus we distribute our data object across 100 diﬀerent nodes with each node
having a chunk of size 10MB.
Ideally if there is no node churn, the availability of each chunk remains at 4. However, in
presence of node churn, we observe diﬀerent behaviors depending on the nodes selected and
their churning behavior. For our ﬁrst experiment we evaluate two diﬀerent node selection
strategies. In the ﬁrst strategy, we select nodes randomly from the set of all participating
nodes. In the second strategy, we use history information to select nodes. Speciﬁcally,
we monitor participating nodes’ ﬁve day availability and use that as a metric to do node
selection. Nodes with higher availability are preferred over nodes with lower availability
(each node though can get only a limited set of tasks and thus only the nodes having empty
task slot is considered for the selection).
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Figure 7.3: Data Availability: Random vs Informed Selection (Skype Trace)
Figure 7.2 shows the results of this experiment on a 10000-node overlay based on the
Microsoft Trace. Here we tabulate the impact of node churn on object availability for three
cases – two based on random selection and a third (called Smart AV) based on an informed
selection of nodes using availability over the past 5 days. In each case, 100 diﬀerent nodes are
selected for caching the data object at the start of the sixth day (as the past ﬁve days worth
of availability data is used as history as described above). For the two random selection
cases, we use two diﬀerent seeds to select nodes based on a uniform random distribution.
Figure 7.2 shows the cumulative time spent by the data object with a given availability
over a period of 30 days. Whenever a node goes down, the availability of chunks stored on it
decreases by one. Similarly when a node reboots or rejoins the collective, it resumes serving
the previously cached chunk, thus increasing the availability of its cached chunk by one. We
deﬁne the availability of the object based on the availability of the least available chunk.
Here we can observe that the Smart AV selection strategy improves overall availability.
With random selection 1, the data object spendsaround 16 days with an availability of 2 and
10.5 days at an availability of 3. With random selection 2, the data object spends around
16 days with an availability of 2 followed by around 7.6 days with an availability of 1. In
comparison, with the Smart AV selection the data objects spends around 22.6 days with an
availability of 3 followed by around 5.5 days with an availability of 2.
Figure 7.3 shows a similar graph for the Skype trace. Here the results are not as good as
for the Microsoft trace. Here also Smart AV selection strategy improves overall availability
by decreasing the time spent with availability of 0 or 1 and by increasing the time spent
with availability of 2 or 3.
Thus a collective system can handle churn better by using historical data as a guide
to select nodes strategically. In practice, we use this strategy in conjunction with other
strategies discussed further in this chapter.
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Figure 7.4: Microsoft Trace: Random vs Smart BW Selection
7.3.2 Bandwidth Aware Scheduling
Another important metric for node selection is the upload bandwidth rate of diﬀerent nodes.
Individual participating nodes have diﬀerent upload bandwidth and thus a scheduling strat-
egy that can utilize this knowledge can provide huge beneﬁts. For example, available band-
width for a content can be improved by creating a replica on a node with large upload
bandwidth.
To better understand the potential beneﬁt of bandwidth-aware scheduling, we experiment
with Microsoft and Skype traces enhanced with bandwidth data. We assign upload band-
width for each participating node between 10KBps and 200KBps based on a uniform random
distribution. Similar to the experiment described in the previous subsection, we experiment
with 250 MB data object that is divided into 25 chunks of 10MB each and each chunk
is distributed over four nodes. Thus the content is spread over 100 diﬀerent nodes. Here
we compare the performance of three diﬀerent strategies – two random selection strategies
and an informed selection strategy called Smart BW. In the Smart BW selection strategy,
nodes with higher upload bandwidth are preferred over nodes with lower upload bandwidth.
Figure 7.4(a) shows the availability of the least available chunk for these three strategies.
Here we observe that nodes selected using the smartBW selection strategy provides more or
less similar availability pattern as that of random selection strategies. However the available
bandwidth diﬀer substantially between diﬀerent strategies. Figure 7.4(b) shows the available
bandwidth for the least available chunk averaged over the experiment duration. The least
available chunk is the chunk with the minimum available bandwidth among all chunks at
any instant of time. Here the Smart BW strategy is clear winner in terms of providing more
bandwidth. SmartBW achieves more than a 2x improvement in average bandwidth available
in comparison with both random selection strategies. Figure 7.5 shows the similar graph for
Skype trace. Here also Smart BW strategy shows good improvement over random strategies.
Though in practice, we will have multiple objects cached on a node and the available
bandwidth of a node will get divided into multiple objects cached on it.
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Multiple Tasks on a Node
In a collective, we store multiple data objects on a node to eﬃciently utilize available re-
sources.
In a simple approach, we can cache a single object per node; thus making the complete
bandwidth of a node for a single object. But this leads wasted bandwidth as there are likely
to be times when there is no active requests for that object. Also even if there is an active
request, it may not completely utilize the available bandwidth. Putting multiple data objects
tend to ﬁx this as when there is no demand of one object, bandwidth can be used for other
objects.
Given multiple data objects on a node, the sharing of bandwidth is dependent on ac-
tual distribution of requests for diﬀerent objects cached on a node. When there are active
requests only for a single object, it can use 100% available bandwidth for it. When there
are requests for more than one object at a time, the available bandwidth is shared among
various objects in proportion to their BW Share. BW Share are assigned per object by the
collective manager.
To analyze this phenomenon, we explore the impact of multiple data objects cached
together on a node. This node has an upload bandwidth of 100KBps and has three data
objects cached together called D1, D2, and D3 of size 5MB each. For these experiments,
we simulate a 12 hour period. For our ﬁrst set of experiments, each data object is assigned
equal share of bandwidth (represented as BW share of 1 each). We run there experiments –
ﬁrst with client requests at the rate of 15 requests per hour for each object, second with 25
requests per hour, and third with 35 requests per hour for each object. These requests are
simulated based on diﬀerent traces generated according to a Poisson process for each object.
Figure 7.6 summarizes the results of this experiment. Here we plot the average bandwidth
available for each data object over the 12 hour period. To calculate this, we keep track of
time periods when there is one or more active requests for a data object and corresponding
bandwidth and then average them to calculate average bandwidth. For 15 requests per hour
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Figure 7.6: Multiple Objects on a Node: Average Bandwidth per Object
we get an average bandwidth of 61.19 KBps, 61.32 KBps, and 60.56 KBps for D1, D2, and
D3 respectively. These numbers are signiﬁcantly better than the one third share of 100KBps,
i.e., 33.33 KBps for each data object. This is because each object is able to utilize a much
higher share of the available bandwidth during time-periods when there are active requests
only for only one or two data objects. In the ideal case where the active periods of D1, D2,
and D3 are disjoint, each object will get the full available bandwidth for itself, i.e., an average
bandwidth of 100 KBps each. This shows the value of scheduling multiple data objects on
a node. In contrast, for 35 requests per hour we get an average bandwidth of 33.29 KBps,
33.28 KBps, and 33.33 KBps for D1, D2, and D3 respectively. Here the node has active
requests for all there objects most of the time; thus bandwidth is shared evenly among the
three objects. Figure 7.6 also shows numbers for 25 requests per hour for the comparison.
For our next ﬁgure, we repeated the experiment described above with diﬀerent bandwidth
share (represented by BW Share) per object. Here D1 has a share of 2, while D2 and
D3 have share of 1 each; i.e., D1 is having double share of bandwidth than D2 and D3.
Figure 7.7 shows the average bandwidth available for each data object over the 12 hour
period for this experiment. For 35 requests per hour, we get an average bandwidth of 49.94
KBps, 25.06 KBps, and 25.11 KBps for D1, D2, and D3 respectively. Here there are active
requests for all three objects for most of the time and the available bandwidth is shared in
proportion to relative shares of each object correctly. Similarly for 15 requests per hour, we
get an average bandwidth of 72.16 KBps, 57.88 KBps, and 57.50 KBps for D1, D2, and D3
respectively. Similar to our earlier experiment, each data object is able to achieve higher
average bandwidth due to getting a much higher share of the available bandwidth during
less busy time-periods.
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Figure 7.7: Multiple Objects on a Node: Performance with Diﬀerent Shares
Overall, scheduling of multiple tasks provide an opportunity to eﬃciently utilize the
available resources of a node. At the same time, resource shares provide ﬁner control that
can be used by the CM to allocate more resources to a selected task.
The result shown in the start of the bandwidth aware selection subsection (i.e., Fig-
ure 7.4(b) and 7.5) have to be considered in complement with above results. Given an
object, the CM can achieve required results by assigning appropriate BW Share on selected
nodes.
7.3.3 Shift Work Scheduling
Shift Work is a popular employment practice in industry to utilize resources for 24 hours
per work day instead of standard working hours of 8-9 hours from morning till evening. As
a part of this practice, a day is divided into multiple shifts (typically 3 shifts of 8 hrs each)
and each employee works just one of the shift every day.
Our shift work scheduling strategy is very similar to this industrial practice. As part of this
strategy, a given job is performed by set of two or more nodes who rotate the responsibility
similar to a time shift manner.
This sort of strategy is useful in cases where end nodes might be online only for limited
periods of time. For example, some oﬃce desktops might be online only from morning to
evening while some home PCs might be online only from evening to mid-night. At a glance,
such nodes do not appear to be a good ﬁt for providing services as they are oﬄine very often.
However a smart collective manager can identify patterns in nodes’ availability and use this
knowledge to exploit nodes’ availability in a shift work style.
As a case study, we have applied the shift work selection strategy to nodes selected from
the Microsoft trace. As discussed earlier, there is a periodic dip in the number of active
nodes in the Microsoft trace, as shown in ﬁgure 7.1(a). These periodic dips occur every
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Figure 7.8: Shift Work Strategy: Availability of a Chunk (Microsoft Trace)
seven days, where the number of available nodes drops drastically for around 2 days during
each cycle. One explanation for this phenomenon is that some users may be switching oﬀ
their desktop PCs over the weekend. This sort of periodicity can be handled eﬀectively by
applying shift work strategy. As an example, we selected 4 nodes from the Microsoft trace
that were oﬄine in tune with the above pattern during ﬁrst 7 days of trace (i.e., during
the ﬁrst periodic dip). We replicated a data chunk on these nodes and then measured its
availability during the 35 days of trace. Figure 7.8(a) shows the availability of this data
object. We can observe that availability of the data object goes to zero every seven days
except during the third 7-day cycle around the 18th-19th day. To handle this availability of
zero, we created an additional replica of object on a node that served the object over the
64 hour window every seven days in a time shift manner (the 64 hour period corresponds to
5pm on Friday to 9am on Monday). Figure 7.8(b) shows the availability of the object after
applying this shift work pattern. We can observe that now availability never drops below
zero, i.e., 7-day cycle is ﬁxed with the help of a shift work node.
In summary, the shift work strategy is an excellent way to utilize the diversity of nodes
available in a collective. This strategy can exploit the variance in node availability patterns
and service demand patterns caused by time diﬀerences among nodes in diﬀerent geograph-
ical locations. The success of this approach lies in identiﬁcation of useful patterns among
participating nodes. Luckily, there is a large body of research work in related domains of
statistical learning, data mining, and machine learning [11, 50, 78] that can be utilized for
this purpose.
7.4 Reactive Scheduling
Reactive scheduling involves taking immediate actions based on observed dynamic behaviors
to improve service performance. To achieve this, the scheduling system tracks diﬀerent
performance metrics and triggers changes whenever a tracked metric goes above or below a
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Figure 7.9: Availability Impact of Failure-aware Scheduling
particular threshold. Two main categories of reactive scheduling are failure-aware scheduling
and demand-aware scheduling.
7.4.1 Failure-aware Scheduling
Failure aware scheduling works by actively tracking node failures in the system and mitigating
those failures through corrective actions, e.g., by initiating additional replicas on detecting
a node failure. A collective system can use variety of methods to detect failures and node
churn as discussed in Section 3.2.2.
Here we analyze the value of reacting to failures in improving the system performance.
Our experiment is similar to the one performed in Section 7.3.1 - i.e., we divide a 250 MB
data object into 25 chunks of 10MB each and replicate each chunk over four nodes. Our
experiment compares the performance of two strategies – Smart AV strategy, as deﬁned in
Section 7.3.1, and a failure-aware strategy built on top of Smart AV strategy.
In this failure-aware strategy we select nodes based on their past ﬁve day availability. In
addition, we detect node churn and initiate corrective action by creating alternative replicas
whenever we detect a node failure. To simulate failure detection time, we introduce a delay
of one hour before we take corrective action after a node goes oﬄine. Figure 7.9(a) shows the
availability of the least available chunk based on these two strategies for the Microsoft trace.
We observe that the failure aware strategy leads to signiﬁcant improvement compared to the
basic smart AV strategy, which itself was a great improvement over random strategies.
Figure 7.9(b) shows the similar plot for Skype trace. We again observe that failure-
aware scheduling leads to signiﬁcant improvement in availability in comparison to Smart AV
strategy.
Overall, failure-aware scheduling is an important tool in the hand of the scheduler, and
alongwith history-aware scheduling, it provides an eﬃcient mechanism to mitigate the eﬀect
of underlying unreliability in the system.
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Figure 7.10: Demand-aware Scheduling: Average Available bandwidth w.r.t. Time
7.4.2 Demand-aware Scheduling
Another important reactive strategy is based on detecting and responding to changes in
a service demand rate. For example, in a collective content distribution service (CCDS),
whenever the demand for a particular content (e.g., a popular movie) increases, there needs
to be a corresponding increase in its degree of replication to meet the increasing demand.
Our demand-aware scheduling algorithm is built on top of a trigger invocation system in
the collective manager. Diﬀerent agents monitor diﬀerent phenomenon. When the agents
detect a change greater than a threshold, they trigger an event for the scheduler to act upon.
As an example, content distributors in the CCDS service have an accurate understanding of
client demand as it is directly related to the content sale rate. Whenever the demand of a
content changes above or below a predeﬁned threshold, it triggers an event for the scheduler.
The scheduler then acts upon this trigger by increasing or decreasing the caching of the
content over the collective overlay accordingly.
To analyze the value of demand-aware scheduling, we experiment with a content caching
scenario using the Microsoft trace over a 10-day period. For this experiment, we assign each
participating node with an upload bandwidth of 40KBps. Similar to earlier experiments, we
divide a 250 MB data object into 25 chunks of 10MB each. Initially the observed demand
for the content is 50 requests per hour, which requires each chunk to be replicated on four
nodes; thereby distributing the content over 100 diﬀerent nodes. We then slowly increase the
sale rate of the content and at the start of 6th day it crosses 75 requests per hour. At this
moment the content distributor triggers an increased-demand event to the scheduler. The
scheduler receives the event and reacts by increasing the replication of each chunk from 4 to
6 to handle the 50% increase in demand rate. Figure 7.10 compares the average bandwidth
available for a chunk for this demand-aware strategy in comparison to based ﬁxed replication
61strategy. We can observe that the demand-aware strategy leads to an increase in available
bandwidth to handle increased load.
We perform another experiment for demand-aware scheduling where we emulate multiple
clients requesting a data object using emulab network testbed. Details and results of this
experiment are discussed in the next chapter (section 8.6).
7.5 Network Aware Scheduling
Network-aware scheduling focuses on collecting information about the network location of
participating nodes and utilizing this information to improve scheduling. For example, given
a client request for an object, we can fulﬁll it by selecting a random replica or we can select
a replica based on network topology information (e.g., select a replica near the requester).
Depending upon circumstances and service involved, diﬀerent aspects of a node’s network
topology can be important. For a content distribution service, the bandwidth between a
client and PNs is more important than latency between them. In contrast, a collective
network probing service (discussed in Section 9.2) needs nodes from a speciﬁc ISP or at a
speciﬁc physical location.
A clear picture of network topology can unearth many interesting opportunities. For
example, university networks or ISPs like utopia network [74] have intra-domain bandwidth
that is much higher than their Internet bandwidth. In these situtations, selecting a node
within the same network can provide much higher bandwidth than selecting a node anywhere
else in the Internet. Many research papers [45, 53, 3, 35] have shown that using network-
aware approaches can improve application performance substantially.
However getting an accurate picture of network topology is not straightforward and
requires otherwise unnecessary probing traﬃc. The P4P project [3] addresses this problem
in an interesting way. In P4P, application developers work in cooperation with Internet
service providers (ISPs) to obtain useful network topology and traﬃc information. In return,
they help ISPs ensure eﬃcient network usage, for example, by not overloading a high cost
inter-AS link but rather using an alternate low cost path exposed by the ISP. Even though
this project is quite new, there is already a consortium of ISPs (e.g., Pando network, Verizon
Communications, and Comcast, among others) in its working group [59] and an internet
draft [35] was released in October 2008 describing the experiences from a P4P trial on many
ISPs.
Overall, network aware scheduling is an important tool in the hands of a collective sched-
uler. With decent network topology information (either with cooperation from ISP or based
on network probing), a network aware scheduler can improve service performance substan-
tially.
7.6 Eﬀective Utilization of PN Resources
Our collective model provides a practical way to eﬃciently utilize idle resources of end-nodes.
There are two main reasons for this: (i) our information-aware scheduling that understand
each node’s resource capabilities and (ii) the controls made available by a virtual machine
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Figure 7.11: Resource Utilization: Multiple Objects vs Single Object on a Node
centric approach that allows un-utilized resources to be used without aﬀecting normal work.
Eﬀective Scheduling of Services:
A node’s idle resources are perishable — if they are not used, their potential value is lost.
In an incentive model that employs bartering, e.g., BitTorrent, nodes typically participate in
the system only long enough to perform a particular transaction such as downloading a song.
At other times, that node’s idle resources are not utilized unless the node’s administrator
is altruistic. In contrast, in a collective the CM has much larger and more diverse pools of
work than personal needs of individual participants; thus a CM is better able to consume
the perishable resources of PNs.
In a collective, the CM schedules multiple services with diﬀerent resource requirements
on a node to eﬃciently utilize its resources. To analyze this phenomenon, let us reconsider
the scenario used in Section 7.3.2. Here a node has an upload bandwidth of 100 KBps and
can cache one or more objects on it. We compare two scenarios; in the ﬁrst scenario only
a single 5 MB data object is cached on the node, while in the second scenario three 5 MB
data objects are cached on the node. Each data object receives client requests at a rate of
15 requests per hour These requests are simulated based on traces generated according to
a Poisson process for each object for a 12-hour simulation period. Figure 7.11 summarizes
the results of this experiment. In the case where we cache only a single object, only 21.33%
of upload bandwidth is utilized . That is, the upload bandwidth of the node is used only
for 2.56 hours out of the 12 hours. In comparison, caching three objects on the node at the
same time leads to 61.15% utilization of the upload bandwidth. Thus using idle resources
to run multiple services improves resource utilization on the node.
Another thing to consider is the ability of a CM to understand the unique resource ca-
pabilities of individual PNs and utilize them for the best returns. For example, a node
63may have limited bandwidth capabilities but is always online, while another node may not
be consistent in its availability, but have a fat bandwidth pipe. As our collective manager
accumulates historical records of every PN, it can easily detect these patterns and utilize
them strategically. This sort of smart scheduling not only improves the overall performance
of a collective system, but also leads to higher returns to participating nodes. A scheduling
system that allocates all participating nodes same way can not exploit unique features of
each node.
VM Control for Eﬀective Utilization:
An easy approach for idle resource utilization is based on a binary decision of a node
being used or not by a user. That is, if the software detects any active user logged on the
node, it does not run the application. This is a simple approach, but suﬀers from under-
utilization of resources. With modern computers, there are lot of un-utilized resources even
when a user is actively using the machine. What we want is a control system that gives
preference to local user’s resource needs, but allows un-utilized resources to be used by the
collective.
We achieve this goal with the help of virtual machine technology. The decision to use
virtual machine as the unit of resource allocation has several important advantages over
alternative approaches. Virtual machine technology allows greater isolation, ﬂexibility, and
resource control than running application processes directly on top of a standard Windows
or Linux box.
Most importantly, the virtual machine monitor can enforce preferential treatment to local
host processes. Dynamic priorities can be set for both cpu cycles and network bandwidth,
while static limits can be set for disk quotas and physical memory allocation. Moreover if
the host user wants, he/she can enforce more stronger resource controls for cpu and band-
width, e.g., pre-determined cpu share or upper caps on bandwidth utilization. These controls
provide powerful tools in the hands of PN administrators to ensure that normal work can
proceed on the PN without undue impact from collective. The protection and resource con-
trols provided by VMs to participating nodes can make people more willing to make their
machines accessible to the collective even when they are actively using it.
7.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have shown how the underlying diversity of PNs’ resources and availability
can be exploited in a simple but useful manner to improve service performance and avail-
ability. Idle resources of end-nodes suﬀer from unreliability and heterogeneity, but amid this
chaos lies some order that can be exploited by intelligent resource tracking and scheduling.
The collective’s scheduler approach is based on information collection and adaptation.
The scheduler collects a wide variety of information from diverse sources in the environment
and uses this information intelligently to adapt the system behavior to best suit the underly-
ing environment and service needs. Existing systems built for exploiting end-node’s resources
(e.g., bitTorrent, kazaa etc), do not have the capability to schedule tasks at will on partic-
ipating nodes and hence can not optimally utilize the unique abilities of each participating
node.
64We have presented three classes of intelligent scheduling strategies in this chapter: history
aware scheduling, reactive scheduling, and network aware scheduling. These scheduling
strategies help in improving performace of services built out of end-nodes and can make
collectives an important platform for commercial services.
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Implementation
In this chapter we present the implementation details of a prototype collective system. We
start with a quick overview of the diﬀerent players in a collective system in Section 8.1.
We then describe the underlying authentication framework and inter-player communication
mechanism in Section 8.2. We follow this discussion with details of partners and clients
in Section 8.3. The implementation of the collective manager and participating nodes are
discussed in Sections 8.4 and 8.5 respectively. We then present the results of validation
experiments performed at Emulab network emulation testbed [2] in Section 8.6. We then
discuss scalability-related issues in Section 8.7 and ﬁnally summarize in Section 8.8.
8.1 Players in a Collective
Figure 8.1 shows the high level architecture of a collective. As shown in the ﬁgure, a collective
system has four main players: a collective manager, participating nodes, partners, and clients.
A Collective Manager (CM) is the central hub for a collective system. There is only one
collective manager per collective. The CM is deployed on multiple server nodes at a single
or potentially multiple sites across the Internet. Participating nodes are end nodes with idle
compute, storage, or network resources that can be exploited by the collective. There can
be thousands or millions of independent participating nodes all connected to the Internet
through any variety of networking. Partners are service collaborators that use the collective
overlay to oﬄoad all or part of their tasks associated with the service. Partners could
be considered to be a front-end for services. For example, in CCDS a content distributor
Figure 8.1: Players in a Collective System
66manages content listing and selling itself, but uses the collective overlay to distribute content
on its behalf. Partners run their own managed software and interact with the collective
manager periodically to oﬄoad their tasks. Clients are individuals that use a service managed
by the collective. Clients use a service-speciﬁc application to interact with a service, e.g., a
collective backup service (CBS) client uses an application to save ﬁles and to view and restore
already saved ﬁles. Diﬀerent players can have completely diﬀerent system environments as
long as inter-player interfaces are well deﬁned. For example, the CM, some partners and
some clients may have linux based system environment, while other PNs and clients may
run a windows based environment.
For our prototype, we have implemented these players in a Linux based environment. We
use a mixture of C and C++ for most of the implementation and perl for experimentation
scripts.
8.2 Authentication and Inter-Player Communication
We need a simple but secure mechanism for mutual authentication as well secure communi-
cation between players.
The Authentication system used in our prototype is based on public key infrastructure
(PKI) [57]. PKI is a mechanism that binds the public key of a player with its identity with
the help of a certiﬁcate authority. This certiﬁcate authority role is performed by the CM in
our collective, i.e., the CM acts as the root of the PKI employed by a collective. Each player
in a collective is identiﬁed by a unique machine-generated ID and a unique public-private
key pair. These identities are bound together with the help of a certiﬁcate generated by the
CM that associates the public key of a player with its unique ID. The unique ID, public key
and the signed certiﬁcate together provide the necessary mechanism for identiﬁcation and
authentication of any player in the system.
Communication between diﬀerent players in a collective (e.g, between a PN and the CM,
or a partner and the CM, or a client and PN) happens over TCP/IP secured with the help
of the Transport Layer Security Protocol (TLS) [22, 65]. TLS is a sister protocol of popular
SSL protocol and provides the mechanism to build a secure communication channel over
TCP/IP. It can provide both privacy and data integrity between two communicating ends.
TLS uses PKI system described above for authentication of both communicating ends.
For our implementation, we use the OpenSSL library [58], which provides an open source
implementation of the TLS protocol. OpenSSL is written in C and is a widely used TLS/SSL
library in the Unix and Linux worlds.
8.3 Partners and Clients
Partners are service collaborators that use the collective overlay to oﬄoad part of their tasks.
From a client perspective, the service is oﬀered by a partner and they may not even notice
the presence of the collective. A Partner can be an external entity, e.g., a content distributor
that uses the collective for content distribution. Or a partner can be an internal entity whose
front-end is managed by the collective itself, e.g., the CBS server in the collective backup
service (Figure 5.1).
67Partners run their own managed software and can develop it in any way they want. They
interact with the service manager running as part of the CM for oﬄoading their tasks to the
collective overlay. Service managers provide a well deﬁned API for partners to interact with.
For example, a content distributor interacts with corresponding service manager to cache
particular content and to pass on information like current demand rate to help in scheduling.
Clients are individuals that wish to utilize the services oﬀered by partners, e.g., down-
loading a video. Clients use an application that they download from a partner’s website to
use a service. This application interacts with the corresponding partner for service listing
and purchase, but uses the collective overlay for the actual service. Partners need to develop
client applications in collaboration with the collective.
8.4 Collective Manager
A collective manager is a resource manager; it aggregates computing resources of thousand
or millions of participating nodes and uses them to build useful services. The work of
the collective manager can be divided into multiple components. Figure 8.2 shows these
components and how they interact. There are six main components. Service managers are
per-service agents that are responsible for managing all aspects of a service in the system.
The resource scheduler is the central component that helps allocation of resources between
diﬀerent services. The node manager, report collection engine, oﬄine analysis engine, and
oﬄine TTP system are support components that help help with the tracking of resource
utilization across the collective.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. We start with the data layer and inter-
component communication system in Section 8.4.1. We then describe the resource scheduler
in Section 8.4.2 followed by service managers in Section 8.4.3. Finally we discuss diﬀerent
support components in Section 8.4.4.
8.4.1 Data Layer and Inter-Component Communication
In a collective manager, diﬀerent components are glued together with the help of a data layer
and an inter-component communication system. Each component is a separate program and
can be instantiated on independent machines or can be co-located with other components.
The data layer is responsible for handling all data needs of diﬀerent components in a
collective manager (CM). A CM needs persistent data storage to store records of partici-
pating nodes, past history records, service performance records, oﬄine analysis records, and
payment-related records. Our prototype uses a MySql database as the back-end for the data
layer.
While the data layer provides a mechanism to access data as and when needed by com-
ponents, a separate system is used to deliver messages to components dynamically. This
dynamic message delivery system is based on the Spread toolkit. Spread [70] is a group
communication toolkit that supports application-level multicast, group communication, and
point to point communication. It is resilient to faults across local and wide area networks.
Spread has been used for Zope replication service [81] and for the backend of the popular
wordpress.com website, among others.
68Figure 8.2: Collective Manager Components
We use Spread in the CM as a loosely coupled way to communicate between diﬀerent
components. This loosely coupled communication mechanism is important as the CM has
been structured as a collection of replicated components for load management. That is,
there can be multiple replicated copies of a single component on multiple server nodes each
handling part of the load. A new replica of a component can be initiated dynamically
either to replace a failed server node or to handle increased load. In such a system, Spread
ensures that a message is received by the right receiver without the sender worrying about
the location of receiving component.
Every server conﬁgured as a part of the CM runs a Spread daemon on it. All local
components running on a server register with the local spread daemon so they can send
and receive messages to/from diﬀerent groups. Diﬀerent Spread daemons interact with each
other to manage group memberships and to ensure correct message delivery.
8.4.2 Resource Scheduler
The resource scheduler is responsible for keeping track of all available resources in the system
and their allocation across diﬀerent services. As described in Chapter 7, the collective
scheduler is an information-aware system that collects information from all available channels
(e.g, the past performance of individual PN, resource proﬁles of each PN, service demands,
etc.) and uses this information to make informed scheduling decisions.
69The bulk of this work is performed with the help of an information collection engine
and an oﬄine analysis engine that collect and process information, respectively, for use by
the resource scheduler. Processed information is stored in the data layer from where the
scheduler can get it whenever it needs. The scheduler also uses the data layer for keeping
track of current resource allocation patterns and other state associated with scheduling.
The control ﬂow of a resource scheduler can be seen as a request-response cycle with
service managers. Service Managers are agents responsible for ensuring that a service is
running smoothly. They issue requests to the resource scheduler for resource allocation
according to their needs and get appropriate resources in return.
8.4.3 Service Managers
Service managers are agents running on the CM that are responsible for the performance
of individual services. Service managers are the central hub for a service and need to be
designed especially to handle the requirements of a particular service.
A service manager’s work starts with a request from a partner. A partner is a front end for
a service and interacts with the service manager to oﬄoad tasks over the collective overlay.
Service manager converts these tasks into small components, and with the help of resource
scheduler, allocates the required resources across diﬀerent PNs. Next, the service manager
ensures that the necessary executables (service agent) and data are copied to the selected
PNs with help from node manager. If needed, the service manager also sends dynamic
instructions to service agents to achieve desired results.
Service managers continuously monitor their service’s performance, validate it against
service goals, and take corrective actions whenever performance degradation happens. In
this work, they are aided by the resource scheduler (who helps them to add or remove
resources to/from the task whenever needed) and performance monitors.
Performance monitors are agents used to observe diﬀerent dynamic phenomenon related
to collective performance. Many of these monitors are part of existing components, though
there can be separate components for monitoring purpose itself. For example, the node
manager keeps track of node churning, partners keep track of service demand rates, etc.
Whenever an observed phenomenon goes above/below a certain threshold, its corresponding
performance monitor invokes an event trigger with the help of the Spread messaging system.
Diﬀerent service managers register with Spread to listen to these triggers and act upon them
when they receive one.
8.4.4 Support Components
These support components help record and track the diverse information available in a
collective.
• Node Manager: A node manager is responsible for shipping necessary executables
and data to the PNs based on service manager requests. It achieves this by connecting
to the VM controller running on participating nodes and providing them necessary
links to data that needs to be downloaded.
70Another important component of the node manager is the liveness server that keeps
track of nodes’ liveness and tracks node failures. As described in Section 3.2.2, the
liveness server actively listens to graceful join and leave messages sent by PNs as well
as indirect messages sent by other players in the system. Based on this information,
it updates each node’s liveness status stored in the data layer and sends messages to
service managers about observed failures using the spread messaging system.
• The information collection engine is responsible for collection of periodic data
sent by diﬀerent components, partners, and PNs. These data play a crucial part in
information aware scheduling as well as in calculation of credit rewards for diﬀerent
PNs. CM also uses these reports to investigate diﬀerent dishonest behaviors in the
system.
Each set of data received by the information collection engine is accompanied with a
message digest digitally signed with the sender private key. The information collection
engine authenticates the sender and verify the data integrity and accompanied digital
signature before storing the data into the data layer for future analysis.
• The Oﬄine data analysis engine focuses on two important tasks: (1) cross-veriﬁcation
of task completion reports sent by PNs and (2) analysis of past performance records
and node resource proﬁles to help resource scheduler. Oﬄine analysis works on the
data available in the data layer.
• The Oﬄine trusted third party (TTP) is used whenever a service need to ensure
non-repudiation for a data transfer, e.g., as described in Section 4.1.4. Our protocol
is directly based on oﬄine TTP (trusted third party) protocol described in [48]. Our
TTP component is a very simple system that actively listens any mediator requests,
answers them based on the protocol, and saves a record of answered queries in the data
layer.
8.5 Participating Nodes
Participating nodes (PNs) are end nodes that provide resources to the collective manager.
Figure 8.3 shows the high level architecture of a PN. There are four main components within
a PN - a node agent, a virtual machine (VM), a VM controller, and service agents.
• The node agent is a small program running on a PN. It is responsible for starting the
virtual machine. When a participating node enters a collective, its administrator starts
by downloading and installing this node agent. The node agent in turn downloads the
required VM image and starts the VM. The node agent also provides a convenient
user interface to PN administrators. PN administrators can use this interface to pause
or stop the virtual machine, and can conﬁgure the resources available to the virtual
machine. The UI also provides the summary of the credits awarded to the PN for
completed work.
• Virtual machine: A PN provides resources to a CM in the form of a virtual ma-
chine (VM). We use Xen as well as the free VMware player to create VMs for our
71Figure 8.3: Participating Node Architecture
prototype. Our VM uses a customized Linux conﬁguration based on the Damn Small
Linux distribution [23] and is less than 50 MB in size. The virtual machine monitor
can enforce resource controls (e.g., disk quota, cpu share, and physical memory limit)
on the VM. This design allows normal, i.e., non-collective realted, work to proceed on
a participating node without undue impact by programs running in the VM.
The VM contains a VM controller for managing the VM and service agents for man-
aging diﬀerent services running on the VM.
The CM has root access to the VM. VM is conﬁgured with a password-less ssh key
based access control mechanism that allows the CM to directly login to the VM. This
public key access system is established through the VM disk image shipped to PN
when it ﬁrst becomes part of a collective. Only the CM can login into the VM using
the above mentioned method. All communication between a PN and the CM is either
layered on ssh or uses TLS [22] connections to the VM controller.
• Service agents are responsible for completing service-speciﬁc jobs assigned to a node.
They are invoked by the VM controller. They get their commands from service man-
agers running in the CM and accordingly perform their tasks.
• The VM controller is the main component responsible for overall management of the
VM running on a participating node. Its work includes instantiation of diﬀerent service
managers, VM resource management and control, and the VM’s interaction with the
collective manager.
To start service agents, the VM controller interacts with the node manager running as
part of the CM. Based on instructions provided by the node manager, the VM controller
downloads the programs necessary to run diﬀerent service agents in the VM. It also
ensures that diﬀerent service agents are instantiated properly and running smoothly.
The VM controller is also responsible for scheduling available computing resources
among competing services. It makes sure that diﬀerent services get resources according
to the high level guidelines provided by the CM. For disk storage this is simple as the
CM’s guidelines specify the storage allocated for each service. However for bandwidth,
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Figure 8.4: Cumulative Data Download vs Time for a Client
the CM provides guidelines in the form of BW shares that VM controller has to enforce
dynamically all the time. The VM controller acheives this with the help of Linux traﬃc
control system [41]. It creates diﬀerent virtual interfaces for each service and then uses
hierarchical token bucket queues [39] to divide the bandwidth between them.
In addition, the VM controller dynamically monitors the resource usage of the node,
e.g., the VM online/oﬄine timings and history of available bandwidth as observed by
passive monitoring of network communication. The VM controller also collects the
service completion records and any other important data from service agents running
on the VM and makes sure that these records and node resource proﬁle records are
sent to the CM periodically.
8.6 Validation on Emulab
To provide basic validation of our prototype, we perform a set of experiments using the
Emulab network testbed [2]. The goal of these experiments is to demonstrate few sample
scenarios of how a collective system performs o a set of representational nodes.
We model the Internet as a cloud (an opaque network) with the help of the lan modeling
option of emulab. Each node in our experiment is connected to this cloud with its last hop
shaped according to its speciﬁc characteristics (described below).
Our ﬁrst experiment explores a collective content distribution service (aka ’CCDS’) that
replicates data over a collective overlay. Here we emulate a collective system with 20 par-
ticipating nodes, each with a download and upload bandwidth of 250KBps and 50 KBps
respectively. These bandwidth numbers depict observed capacity of a typical end user con-
nected to the Internet via a basic Comcast cable broadband service. Each participating
node runs the necessary service agent to support this service. When the experiment starts,
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Figure 8.5: Request Completion Time vs Request Number
a content distributor contacts the collective manager and initiates caching of a 50 MB data
object over the overlay. Upon getting this request, the collective manager decides the cache
distribution pattern for the data object. It divides the object into chunks of 5 MB each (10
chunks total) and then schedules 2 replicas for each chunk; thus allocating 5MB of data on
each of 20 nodes. The collective manager then informs each PN of their speciﬁc allocation.
PNs then start caching of data from the content distributor. Afterwards when a client re-
quests this data object, its request is fulﬁlled through the collective overlay instead of the
content distributor.
Figure 8.4 shows the download performance as seen by a client. Similar to other nodes
in the experiment, the client has a download bandwidth of 250 KBps and upload bandwidth
of 50KBps. Here the X-axis represents time and the Y-axis represents the cumulative data
downloaded by the client. The client downloads the content simultaneously from all 20
participating nodes with diﬀerent chunks coming from diﬀerent nodes. The client takes 291
secs to download the object, achieving an average download rate of 175.95 KBps.
For our second experiment, we emulate a continuous stream of client requests over a 30
min period. These client requests follow a Poisson distribution with a request rate of 60
requests per hour. Each of our client requests is made from a diﬀerent client, each having a
download bandwidth of 250KBps. Figure 8.5 shows the download performance of all client
requests. On the Y-axis we show the download completion time in secs, while on the X-axis
we show the client request number sorted based on request start time. 31 client requests
are made during the 30 min period, though the experiment runs until each of the requests
is completed. As time increases, the number of active downloads in the system increases
and hence an increase in the completion time in the middle of the graph. After 30 minutes,
there are no more new requests coming and hence the number of active requests decreases
and thus the last bunch of requests ﬁnish in less time.
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Figure 8.6: Demand-aware Scheduling: Request Completion Time vs Request Number
Our third experiment shows a case of demand-aware scheduling where the system acts
on a trigger. Here, during the course of the experiment, the client request rate changes
which triggers a corresponding change in scheduling strategy. During the ﬁrst half an hour
of the experiment, 60 requests per hour are made, similar to the previous experiment. After
half an hour, the client request rate is changed to 90 requests per hour. In a production
environment, this change in demand will lead to an hint message from the content distributor
to the collective manager. To emulate this, we inject a message using the spread to inform
the CM about the change in demand at 32 minutes into the experiment. The collective
manager then adapts by increasing the replication degree to 3, which leads to the addition
of 10 more nodes, each caching 5 MB of content.
Figure 8.6 shows the request completion time for this scenario. In this ﬁgure we compare
the performance to two diﬀerent scheduling – ﬁrst where the system adapts dynamically by
adding 10 additional nodes and second where no additional nodes are added. Here similar
to Figure 8.5, the Y-axis represents the request completion time while the X-axis represent
request number sorted according to request starting time. These requests cover 1-hr period;
ﬁrst half an hour clients requests are issued at the rate of 60 per hour and and in second
half an hour at the rate 90 per hour. Requests are emulated using poission distribution. We
observe that demand-aware case performs better than baseline case (represented as normal
scheduling in the plot) due to additional bandwidth becoming available.
8.7 Scalability
Using centralized CMs can impact scalability, but we believe that this potential scalability
problem is manageable. The presence of a centralized CM is an important feature of our col-
lective architecture. Centralized control makes building meaningful commercial distributed
75services feasible, because the CM has a clear idea of the collective system’s resources and can
use information-aware scheduling to provide good service to clients. It also greatly simpliﬁes
the design of services. Additionally, we believe that a trusted CM is necessary for attracting
external partners and large numbers of participating nodes. Our collective model is not
alone in its use of centralization. Many important commercial systems use centralization yet
scale to very large systems, e.g., SETI@home has 5 million users, BitTorrent sessions have
a centralized tracker, and websites like Google and Yahoo! handle huge amounts of traﬃc
every day.
To achieve acceptable scalability, the CM is designed as replicated distributed services
run on dedicated nodes, not on a single computer or on unreliable end nodes. There has
been extensive research and commercial work in this that can be utilized to build a scalable
collective manager [18, 28, 34, 51, 60].
From an implementation standpoint, the collective manager is a collection of multiple
components. These components are instantiated as individual programs and can be dis-
tributed on diﬀerent server nodes for load management. Use of a data layer and inter-
component communication layer ease the diﬃculty of distributing CM components across
multiple nodes. Next, most of these components can be replicated across multiple nodes to
further improve load distribution.
Here we have a look at the diﬀerent components of a collective manager and consider
how they can impact the CM’s scalability. Our main goal is to determine whether each
component can be distributed across multiple servers without major complications (i.e., is
it easily parallelizable or not).
• Data Layer: A well deﬁned data layer separates the data from the collective manager
front-end. This helps a system designer distribute components across diﬀerent server
nodes as long as each component can access the data in an eﬃcient manner.
In terms of the scalability of data layer itself, a database based backend (especially
commercial variants like Oracle) can handle a huge load safely. Also the system can
use a distributed in-memory cache system like memcached [55] for alleviating database
load. As a separate approach, a very big collective can build a system like Bigtable [18,
42] to manage massive data storage needs (there are opensource implementations like
hypertable [42] and Cassandra [17] that provide functionalities similar to bigtable).
• Node Manager and liveness server: The node Manager is responsible for node
registration and for shipping the necessary executables and data to PNs. The liveness
server is responsible for keeping track of node aliveness by receiving direct pings from
PNs during graceful join and leave or by acting on indirect reports sent by other players
based on application level pings. Based on these, it updates node status in the data
backend and sends triggers to service managers if needed. All of these activities are
easily parallelizable as their is no dependency between multiple tasks.
• Information Collection Engine: The information collection engine collects reports
sent by various players in the system, veriﬁes the correctness of senders to protect
forgery and then saves these reports to the data back end. There is no dependency
between diﬀerent report collection activities and hence this work is easily parallelizable
and can be distributed across multiple servers based on the load.
76• Oﬄine Data Analysis Engine: The oﬄine analysis engine focuses on two important
tasks: (1) cross-veriﬁcation of task completion reports sent by PNs and (2) analysis of
past performance records and node resource proﬁles to help resource scheduler.
Cross-veriﬁcation of task completion reports can be easily parallelized. A single analysis
focuses on a single transaction, e.g., a content download by a speciﬁc client during a
speciﬁc time interval). It only requires data records submitted by participating nodes
involved in that transaction. Diﬀerent transactions do not have any cross-dependency
between them for veriﬁcation purposes. So this analysis work can be easily distributed
among separate servers with diﬀerent set of transactions assigned to diﬀerent servers.
Analysis of past performance records and node resource proﬁles can become resource
intensive in the case of a very large collective from millions of nodes. In such a case,
a technique like MapReduce [21] should be deployed to distribute the work across a
number of server nodes.
• Oﬄine Trusted Third party: The trusted third party based protocol is used to
achieve non-repudiation during data exchange whenever needed. Scalability-wise, a
non-repudiation task does not have any dependency with other non-repudiation tasks
and hence can be easily distributed across diﬀerent servers.
Moreover the protocol used in the collective [48] is an oﬄine protocol, i.e., the trusted
third party does not intervene in the protocol when no problem occurs. Only during
a problem does the trusted third party play a role in resolving the issue, which should
be an uncommon event.
• Service Managers: Service managers are per-service agents that are responsible for
ensuring smooth running of services over the collective overlay. The core of a service
manager consists of (1) listening to partner’s requirements and service performance
triggers, (2) making decisions regarding the required distribution of the service over
the collective, and (3) interacting with the resource scheduler for resource allocation.
Scalability wise, diﬀerent service managers can be run on diﬀerent servers. For a single
service manager direct replication is not possible as the major work is involved only
in decision making (step 2 above) and needs to be done by a single master. However,
this work can be distributed in a divide-and-conquer style where sub-problems are
distributed over a cluster of nodes and then results merged on a master node (similar
to MapReduce [21]).
• Resource Scheduler: Due to the presence of the data layer, a resource scheduler
is a stateless system. It acts upon requests made by service managers, decides re-
source allocation, and then update the status in the data backend. Hence, it is easily
parallelizable.
To improve performance, requests related to a particularly high demand task (e.g.,
requests for a highly popular content in CCDS) can be routed to the same instance
of the resource scheduler. This instance can cache processed data related to this task
distribution in its memory to speed decision making. It still needs to ensure data
77freshness and update the data layer after an allocation change so that other instances
of resource scheduler can perform their work correctly.
In summary, a collective manager can be made scalable using techniques developed for
replicated distributed services and for distributing work over a cluster. With the advent of
highly available web-services (e.g. Google, yahoo, Amazon etc.), there has been extensive
research work in this direction [18, 28, 34, 51, 60] that can be utilized to build a scalable
CM.
8.8 Summary
In this chapter we have presented the implementation speciﬁc details of a collective system.
However, methodologies discussed in this chapter present only one out of many possible ways
of implementing a collective system.
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Other Services
A collective infrastructure is a great platform to build variety of distributed services using idle
resources of end-nodes. In this dissertation, we have primarily focused only on a Collective
content distribution service (CCDS) and a collective backup service (CBS). But there can
be many more such services that can exploit the underlying platform oﬀered by a collective
approach.
In this section, we describe four such possible services - a collective compute service,
a collective network probing service, a collective WiFi service, and a collective surrogate
service.
9.1 Collective Compute Service
A node’s idle computing resources can be used productively to run compute-intensive jobs,
especially high-end scientiﬁc computing experiments requiring a large amount of computing
power. Projects that harness the idle computing resources (e.g., seti@home [69]) have been
quite successful.
A collective compute service (CCS) exploits idle computing resources to run compute
intensive tasks. Applications of this service are typically embarrassingly parallel applications,
i.e., applications that can be divided into a large number of independent parallel tasks. Our
design for CCS is similar to the seti@home design. There are two main components of the
CCS that run on the CM and PNs respectively.
To provide this service, Each participating node runs a CCS component inside the VM
called the CCS agent. Compared to directly running an application on the node, as in the
seti@home [69], our VM based model allows us to safely run arbitrary programs on a PN
without introducing any security issues. For example, in 2003 many security vulnerabilities
were discovered in the seti@home software [33]. One vulnerability involved a buﬀer overﬂow
bug that could allow an attacker to take control of the host computer by sending specially
formatted web requests. Using a VM-based approach, CCS provides much more secure
environment; so more potential end nodes can be more willing to participate in such a
system. Also in a VM based solution, the application need only be developed for a single
operating system, because the VM runs an OS image provided by the CM and hence provides
a consistent execution environment for applications.
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CCS manager. CCS agents periodically contact the CCS manager to get a list of tasks and to
download corresponding data and executables CCS agent then runs the task to completion
and sends back the result to the CCS manager.
The CCS manager awards credits to PNs based on actual work units completed. Similar
to other services, a selﬁsh client can cheat by providing bogus results without actually
running the task. To create a deterrent against cheating, a CCS manager sends the same
task to multiple PNs similar to what seti@home already does, and then compare results to
identify cheating. Cheating nodes are penalized heavily to deter cheating.
9.2 Collective Network Probing Service
Over the last few years, there has been a growing interest in Internet measurement. Many
projects have been working on understanding the behavior of the Internet. A measure-
ment system based on measurements taken only from a limited number of academic sites
(e.g., Planetlab) does not provide a representative model of the Internet. One of the best
approaches for ﬁxing this problem is to measure Internet properties from end-nodes dis-
tributed across the Internet. Many projects like DipZoom [77] have been working on such
an approach.
We can use our collective infrastructure to implement a collective network probing service
(CNPS). The CNPS can take network measurements from end-nodes distributed across the
Internet and send results back to the interested party. For example, using such a service one
can easily diagnose DNS resolution issues across multiple ISPs.
9.2.1 Service Design
The CNPS service is provided with the help of a CNPS service manager running as part of the
collective manager. The CNPS service manager interacts with clients interested in Internet
measurements and assigns measurement jobs to a set of PNs. These PNs are selected based
on the type of measurements needed. For example, if a client needs a set of measurements
from all autonomous systems (As) in the USA, the CNPS manager needs to select few nodes
from each AS. Or if a client wants to debug a DNS problem from a particular ISP, then the
CNPS manager needs to select a set of nodes from that particular ISP.
On the participating node side, the CNPS service is managed by a CNPS agent run-
ning inside the VM. Based on the measurement job assigned by the CNPS service manager,
the CNPS agent downloads the required measurement probe executable from the collective
manager. Each measurement job consists of a probe and corresponding timing information
(e.g., run the probe once every 3 hours for 2 days). The CNPS agent schedules diﬀerent
measurements assigned to the node at the requested times and sends back the results of the
measurements to the CNPS service manager. The CNPS service manager collects measure-
ments results from diﬀerent PNs and submits the complete report back to the clients.
Deterring Cheating Behaviors:
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actual measurements. There can be many approaches to ensure to create a deter against
cheating. For example, a given measurement can be submitted to multiple nodes in the
same ISP and their results can be compared to ensure that the results look similar. Another
approach might be based on auditing, where a PN can be issued measurement requests that
are tracked to ensure if the work is actually performed or not. For example, an http get
request to a trusted web server - the collective manager can use the website logs of trusted
web server to check if the measurement was actually made or not.
Additionally a rational node would not be very interested to fake results if the cost of
making measurements is negligible in terms of resources consumed. For CNPS, the real value
of a network measurement comes from a node’s unique location on the Internet. Typical
network measurement takes minimal system resources and these resources are insigniﬁcant
compared to usual work performed on a computer. Thus if CNPS can avoid any measure-
ments based on bulk data transfer, it may not suﬀer from cheating behaviors.
9.3 Collective WiFi Service
The basic idea behind a collective WiFi Service (CWS) is to exploit un-utilized bandwidth
available through existing WiFi installations in private administrative domains, e.g., home,
shopping complexes, or oﬃces. Our proposed CWS service uses these existing WiFi instal-
lations to provide Internet service to external clients.
The CWS service is provided with the help of a CWS manager running on the collective
manager. This CWS manager acts as an global authentication and accounting service.
Anyone interested in sharing his Internet connection registers his WiFi hub with the CWS
manager. The registered hub can then share its Internet connection with external clients
and gets compensated in return.
9.3.1 Service Design
Startup and Session Establishment
Interested clients need to ﬁrst register with the CWS manager and buy service credits to use
the CWS service. They can then connect to any CWS-enabled WiFi hub in their environment
and gets charged according to their usage.
In detail, a registered client need to download and install a software on his/her mobile
device (e.g., laptop) that aids in authentication with CWS-enabled WiFi hubs. A typical
client session starts with a client using the standard WiFi hub discovery mechanism based
on SSID broadcast to list the WiFi hubs in his/her immediate environment. Once a CWS-
enabled WiFi hub is selected, the user’s mobile device can connect and authenticate itself
automatically with the help of the installed CWS software.
Security and Authentication
For the easiest conﬁguration, a CWS-enabled wiﬁ-hub can be set to not use encryption.
Doing so will allow external devices to easily connect to the hub and get a temporary IP
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packets to the Internet can be layered on top of this. However, wireless networks without
any encryption are inherently unsafe, as intruders can snoop without any restrictions. This
conﬁguration puts both the external as well as internal nodes connected to the WiFi hub on
security risk and thus is not recommended.
WiFi Protected Access (WPA) based on the 802.1x authentication is the currently pre-
ferred security/encryption standard for WiFi. Our proposed solution is to set a master
802.1x authentication server at the CWS manager and a local 802.1x authentication server
(e.g., tinyPEAP [73]) on each WiFi-hub. Any incoming connection request is ﬁrst authenti-
cated against the local 802.1x server and if that fails, the request is authenticated using the
master authentication server running on the CWS. Authentication against the local 802.1x
server provides internal/local users (i.e., the users who own that WiFi hub) an uninterrupted
access to the Internet. Thus, both internal users and external clients use the standard WPA
authentication and encryption mechanism to access the Internet.
Accounting
Whenever a client accesses the Internet through a CWS-enabled hub, the client is charged
by the CM for the service. In turn, the administrator of the hub gets credits for sharing
his/her connection. This charging and awarding of credits requires an accurate accounting
of the service usage.
Both external clients and administrators of hubs may cheat by providing wrong informa-
tion to the CM. To deter this cheating, we propose a solution based on signed certiﬁcates.
In our proposed solution, each registered CWS client is associated with a public-private key
pair that are used for digital signatures.
CWS Internet service is charged based on actual connection time measured as a multiple
of a ﬁxed time-unit called CWSU (e.g., 5 mins). A user using the service for a time smaller
than CWSU is charged for a complete CWSU. To access the Internet, a client has to provide
a signed authorization certiﬁcate to the hub after every CWSU mins to continue the service.
A typical authorization certiﬁcate will contain the IDs of the client, hub as well as a signed
authorization by the client to charge for access to a single unit of CWS service. These
authorization certiﬁcates can be generated easily using the CWS software running on the
mobile device.
Sharing Implications
Sharing a private WiFi network with external clients creates few problems. First, external
clients should not be able to access any Windows ﬁle shares or shared printers in the local
environment (and vice versa). Thus the WiFi hub must logically separate local and CWS
network by dropping the packets destined across the boundary.
Secondly, providing too much Internet bandwidth to external clients can aﬀect the In-
ternet bandwidth available to the internal/local users of a WiFi hub To solve this, the
CWS-enabled WiFi hub can limit the bandwidth available to the external users. It can set a
max upload and download bandwidth limits for external clients which they can exceed only
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control can be used to limit the number of concurrent external users.
All these features can be easily implemented in Linux-based WiFi hubs using standard
routing and traﬃc control system available in Linux [41].
9.4 Collective Surrogate Service for Resource-Constrained
Devices
Today’s mobile devices are becoming small computers, complete with integrated cameras,
GPS and MP3 support, and a multitude of other functions. With their nearly ubiquitous
connectivity and increasingly powerful capabilities, mobile devices are being used increasingly
often for critical applications in the social, defense, ﬁnancial, and health sectors.
The same portability that makes mobile devices immensely useful creates many limita-
tions, e.g., limited battery capacity, limited CPU power, and limited storage. The resource
limitations pose challenging problems, but they can be masked by utilizing the resources
of less resource-constrained computers found in the environment, a concept called surrogate
computing or cyber foraging [6, 68, 31].
A collective infrastructure can provide such a service in a simple but eﬃcient manner.
Based on a request made by a resource-constrained device, a collective manager can instan-
tiate required application on a participating node’s VM. This way a participating node can
act as a surrogate for a client device and perform tasks on its behalf. Figure 9.1 illustrates a
simple surrogate usage scenario in which a resource-constrained PDA oﬄoads the compute-
intensive portions of a speech recognition service to a VM running on a participating node.
Figure 9.1: A surrogate computing scenario: Remote speech recognition
This section focuses on two ways that a surrogate service can enhance a conventional
mobile computing environment: by (i) reducing the energy consumption of mobile clients
and by (ii) enabling more powerful applications than can be realistically run on resource-
constrained mobile devices. We present the design of a surrogate service for mobile devices
that allows clients to dynamically invoke compute jobs on participating nodes and show how
it enables interesting mobile applications such as:
• Oﬄoading compute-intensive jobs to a surrogate to enhance the basic capabilities of a
mobile device, e.g., a speech recognition server;
• Oﬄoading network-intensive jobs to a surrogate to reduce the number of battery-
draining network operations that a mobile client needs to perform to accomplish some
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source and mining it to get a result; and
• Oﬄoading client personalization operations to a nearby surrogate, e.g., invoking a
device-speciﬁc proxy server that modiﬁes web content based on the device’s I/O char-
acteristics.
In addition to enabling new applications, a surrogate infrastructure can decrease the
storage, battery, and computation requirements of surrogate-aware mobile devices, thereby
enabling the use of smaller, less complex, and less expensive mobile clients. Surrogate-aware
mobile devices would need only enough local resources to perform their common tasks, and
could use surrogate resources to perform more complex or less common tasks.
For this service, we assume a trust relationship between client and the collective manager
as we allow client devices to run arbitrary application on a surrogate provided by the collec-
tive infrastructure. Such a trust can be established based on the veriﬁcation of real-world
identity of clients, e.g., a veriﬁcation based on credit card transaction. A better approach
can be to allow clients only to instantiate from a list of trusted application supported by a
collective system. Also for this section, we assume a trust relationship between client and
potential surrogates (i.e., selected participating node) and hence do not discuss cheating
issues. This service was actually designed as a precursor to the collective system with a
diﬀerent trust structure in mind.
Previous research [7, 24, 25, 56] has demonstrated some of the potential beneﬁts of using
surrogates to enhance the mobile computing experience. However, surrogate computing has
not received widespread attention or been deployed outside of a handful of academic research
laboratories. We believe that one of the main reason for this lack of impact to date is due to
the requirement that application developers write surrogate-capable applications in a speciﬁc
language and/or restricted environment.
Our surrogate service based on virtual machine technology that addresses these concerns.
Our design enables the safe and eﬀective sharing of surrogate resources, while allowing clients
to install and run arbitrary untrusted code on surrogates. We do not require clients who use
our surrogate infrastructure to use any particular communication framework, development
environment, programming language, or middleware/runtime system. Because we impose no
restrictions on the programming language or runtime system, existing mobile applications
can be ported to use our surrogate service with little eﬀort by partitioning them into a front
end that runs on the mobile client and a back end that runs on the surrogate.
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the architecture and implementation of a surrogate service
built on a collective infrastructure. Then we demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of the surrogate
service by showing how it enhances existing mobile computing applications by reducing their
response time and/or the amount of energy that they consume.
To evaluate the performance and energy beneﬁts of oﬄoading compute- or network-
intensive operations from a mobile client to a surrogate, we have implemented surrogate-
enabled versions of the sphinx2 speech recognizer and a synthetic web services application.
We found that using a surrogate improves the response time of speech recognition by a
factor of 120 while reducing the energy drain on the client device by a factor of 60. For the
synthetic web services operation, response time improves by a factor of 21 and client energy
84drain drops by a factor of 48. In short, using surrogates can lead to dramatic performance
and energy savings.
9.4.1 Design
To set the context of our surrogate service, consider the following usage scenario. A PDA
user clicks on the icon associated with an application conﬁgured to run, at least partially, on
a surrogate machine. If the OS has not already obtained access to a surrogate, it invokes a
surrogate acquisition module to contact a collective manager for access to a surrogate service.
Assuming the client’s access is approved, the collective manager allocates a participating node
for this request and allows the client a direct access to the virtual server/machine running
on the PN.
To invoke an application on the virtual server, the client ships a small program to a
daemon listening on a well known port on the virtual server and the daemon runs the
program on behalf of the client. Typically, this program is a shell script that downloads
the real application over the Internet, installs it, and runs it. Once the surrogate portion of
the application is installed on the surrogate, the client portion of the application running on
the PDA launches a client interface (if any), transparently ships input data to the surrogate
portion of the application, collects responses, and outputs them through the client user
interface.
Session Management
A client wishing to locate a surrogate server contacts a collective manager with its speciﬁc
requirement and is allocated a surrogate by the collective manager.
Each virtual server is conﬁgured to run a surrogate service agent (SSA) that handles
requests for surrogate operations from its client. To invoke an operation on a surrogate, the
client sends a request to the surrogate service manager, which listens on a well known port on
the virtual server. Client requests consist of a URL that points to a program that the client
wants the SSA to run on its behalf. Typically, the program is a shell script that downloads
the necessary software/packages, installs them, and then invokes them. For example, in
Section 9.4.2 we describe an experiment that involves installing a Sphinx2 voice recognition
server on the surrogate and having it accept client voice recognition requests on a well known
port.
Our current protocol utilizes SSL/TLS for client communication with the virtual server
because they are well understood and widely available. For authentication, we use public key
certiﬁcates signed by the collective manager acting as PKI root. After allocating a PN to be
used for surrogate, the collective manager informs the PN about the client certiﬁcate. This
certiﬁcate is used by the surrogate service agent to determine which clients are authorized
to use it.
Programming Interface
We provide a simple client library that supports the following operations:
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description string. Returns a success code. If successful, the IP address of the virtual
server is also returned.
• subtask conf request(): Takes as input the URL where a program that the client
wishes to run can be found, which is sent as a subtask conﬁguration request to the
appropriate surrogate service agent. Returns a success code.
• get virtual server ip(): Returns the IP address of the active surrogate virtual server,
if any.
To enable client-side scripting, these functions are also provided as programs and the
conﬁguration information (e.g., IP address of current surrogate server) is available via envi-
ronment variables.
9.4.2 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate our surrogate service using two applications, the sphinx2 speech
recognition system and a transcoding web proxy. We chose these two applications to in-
vestigate the value of oﬄoading work to surrogates for both compute-intensive applications
(sphinx2) and network-intensive applications (the synthetic web services application).
Experimental Setup
For our experiments, we have two surrogate platforms. The ﬁrst is a Dell Dimension 4550
Series Computer with a 2.40-GHz P4 processor and 512MB of 266 MHz DDR RAM (uni-
versity surrogate). The second is a Dell Dimension 2400 Series Computer with a 2.80-GHz
P4 processor and 512MB of 333 MHz DDR RAM (home surrogate). The client is a Sharp
Zaurus SL-5500 PDA running Linux 2.4.18-rmk7-pxa3-embedix (OpenZaurus distribution
3.5.1). The Zaurus has a 206-MHz SA1110 processor, 16MB of FlashRAM, and 64MB of
DRAM, 24MB of which is dedicated to ﬁle storage. The Zaurus’s network connectivity is
provided by a Linksys WCF12 compact ﬂash 802.11b wireless card.
For all experiments, the client device is connected to the CS department network via
a Wi-Fi access point. To test the importance of the physical proximity of the client and
surrogate, we ﬁrst evaluate the surrogate service with a surrogate co-located on the CS
department LAN (university surrogate) and again with the surrogate at the ﬁrst author’s
home (home surrogate). The home surrogate is connected to the Internet via a cable modem.
The RTT between the client and the university surrogate varies from 2-7ms, whereas the
RTT between the client and the home surrogate varies from 98-114ms.
For each of our applications, we run two sets of experiments, one in which the application
is run in its entirety on the PDA and one in which the resource-intensive portion of the
application is dynamically instantiated on a surrogate node. We ﬁrst report the time required
to initialize the surrogate service, including the time required to perform service discovery,
instantiate a new virtual server, and install and start the test application. We then report
the run times and energy consumed by the PDA to run the application both locally and with
the help of a surrogate. For experiments where we run the application entirely on the PDA,
86Surrogate Location Response Time
Univ 3.843 (0.008)s
Home 22.581 (0.167)s
Home (Caching) 4.417 (0.095)s
Table 9.1: Average response time for instantiating sphinx2 speech recognition engine. Stan-
dard deviations are in parentheses.
we disable the network card and LCD backlight to minimize energy drain. In contrast, when
we execute the resource-intensive portions of the application on the surrogate, we leave the
network card enabled, which results in a conservative estimate of the energy requirement.
In both situations, the PDA is idle other than the test application and an instance of top,
a system management tool that we use to extract CPU and memory utilization.
To determine the amount of energy consumed by the PDA, we monitor the actual current
drawn by the device during the experiment. We use Tektronix TDS784D digital oscilloscope,
using a TCP202 current probe to sample current and a TEK P6139A voltage probe to sample
voltage at the rate of 2500 samples per second. Actual energy consumption is calculated by
the average instantaneous power consumption over a time interval t, multiplied by time t.
For statistical accuracy, each experiment is repeated 5 times and we report the average and
standard deviation over those 5 runs.
Sphinx Speech Recognition
Sphinx2 [40] is a real-time, large-vocabulary, speaker-independent speech recognition system
developed at CMU. It uses pre-made models for American English, including an acoustic
model, a pronunciation dictionary, and a language model. These models are stored in several
ﬁles that in aggregate are roughly 23MB in size. When sphinx2 is loaded and run completely
on the Zaurus, storing 23MB worth of model ﬁles requires deleting most other applications
and user ﬁles from the Zaurus. In contrast, the client stub required to run sphinx2 on the
surrogate server is only 12KB in size.
To perform this experiment, we created two versions of sphinx2, one that ran entirely on
the Zaurus and another that split the functionality between the Zaurus and the surrogate.
For both, we used the sphinx-2.0.4 source code from sourceforge. Porting sphinx2 to run
on the Zaurus required non-trivial eﬀort because it uses non-standard sound driver settings
and the Zaurus sound driver did not support many of the ioctl calls used by sphinx2. Once
ported, it was relatively straightforward to divide the application into two components for use
in our surrogate service. The client portion uses the system calls described in Section 9.4.1
to allocate a virtual server and instantiate an instance of the sphinx2 server. It then records
what the user says and sends the raw digitized sound data to the surrogate for analysis. We
believe this development experience will be typical for surrogates – porting your application
to the small device entails non-trivial work, but splitting the application to exploit surrogate
computing is straightforward.
For our ﬁrst set of experiments, we measure how long it takes to instantiate the sphinx2
application on a participating node’s VM.
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local 44.72 (0.125)s >95% 51.6-55.9% 23MB 32.616 (1.363)J
surrogate univ 0.374 (0.022)s 0.526 (0.028)J
surrogate home 0.948 (0.030)s 0.3-0.5% 1.1% 12KB 1.267 (0.036)J
Table 9.2: Sphinx2 speech recognition on the Zaurus. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Table 9.1 shows the time to download and instantiate a sphinx2 surrogate, which entails
downloading the sphinx2 server software (6.3MB) and starting the server. For this exper-
iment, the server software was stored on a webserver in the same LAN as the university
surrogate computer It takes 3.84 secs to download, install, and run the application on the
university surrogate. The same operations take between 22 and 23 on the home surrogate.
The slower startup on the home surrogate is due to the overhead of downloading 6.3MB of
software across the Internet. If the surrogate is conﬁgured to cache previously downloaded
packages, repeat invocations of sphinx2 require only 4.42 secs to initiate.
Table 9.2 compares the results of running the speech recognizer on the Zaurus and on
the surrogate machines. The performance diﬀerences are striking. When run on the Zaurus,
it takes around 45 secs to recognize a short 4-word phrase, far slower than real time. In
contrast, the surrogate version can recognize the phrase in under a half second when the
client and surrogate share the same LAN, or in just over one second when the surrogate is
accessed over the Internet. In this case, the slower response time for the home surrogate is
due to the higher latency between the client and surrogate and the low upstream bandwidth
of the cable modem.
In addition to dramatically reducing the recognition time, using a surrogate also dra-
matically reduces resource consumption on the Zaurus. As mentioned above, simply storing
the sphinx2 application and model ﬁles on the Zaurus requires deleting most other applica-
tions and data from the Zaurus. Also, when run locally sphinx2 utilizes more than 95% of
the Zaurus’ CPU throughout the experiment, spiking as high as 98.8%, and occupies more
than 50% of its memory. This left the PDA unusable for any other activity, and resulted
in a popup warning, “The Memory is very low. Please end this application immediately!”.
In contrast, using a surrogate reduced the CPU and memory overheads to 0.4% and 1.1%,
respectively, leaving the Zaurus free to perform other tasks.
When we compare the energy cost of invoking the speech recognizer locally versus on the
surrogate, the results again strongly favor using a surrogate. Performing speech recognition
on the university surrogate consumes roughly 60 times less PDA energy than running it on
the Zaurus, while performing speech recognition at on the home surrogate requires roughly
25 times less energy. These results come despite the non-trivial energy consumed transferring
data between the client and surrogate. The PDA consumes roughly 0.271J of energy when
idle for one second, so a small portion of the 32.61J consumed by the local speech recognition
experiment is a ﬁxed cost, but the net savings are dramatic.
Overall, these results clearly show that using a surrogate can lead to dramatic improve-
ments in both response time and energy consumption for compute- and storage-intensive
applications like sphinx2.
88Type Response Time Energy Consumption
local 45.888 (1.721)s 67.394 (0.577)J
surrogate 2.170 (0.055)s 1.400 (0.067)J
Table 9.3: Synthetic Benchmark Results. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Figure 9.2: Synthetic surrogate usage benchmark: Client current consumption
Web Services (Data Mining)
Typical web services entail sifting through potentially large amounts of data acquired from
one or more storage servers. As we shall see, they are also well suited to surrogate com-
puting. In contrast with speech recognition, web service (data mining) applications tend to
be bandwidth-intensive rather than compute-intensive. The amount of computation done
per-byte of data is much lower than for speech recognition. Thus, the potential beneﬁts of
using a surrogate to perform the data ﬁltering include both the reduced processing time and
the reduced amount of data that needs to be transferred over the energy-hungry wireless
LAN.
To evaluate the impact of using a surrogate on this class of applications, we designed
the following synthetic benchmark. The benchmark entails downloading three 6.3 MB ﬁles,
performing an MD5 message digest operation on each ﬁle, and outputting the resulting three
checksum values. For this experiment, we consider only the university surrogate. When the
surrogate is used, the client sends it URLs for the three ﬁles, the surrogate downloads the
three ﬁles and computes their MD5 checksums, and then the surrogate returns the resulting
values to the client. In both the cases, we put the Zaurus’s network card into power saving
mode [79] if there is no network activity. While in power saving mode, the network card
wakes up every 100ms to listen for a beacon message from the access point to determine if
there are any queued messages awaiting delivery.
Table 9.3 presents the results of these experiments. The web site hosting the three ﬁles
resides on the university LAN. Downloading the ﬁles to the Zaurus and performing the MD5
89checksums locally takes 21 times as long and consumes 48 times more battery energy than
using a local surrogate.
Figure 9.2 shows the current consumption pattern of the Zaurus when it uses a surrogate
for this benchmark. We can see that the wireless network card remains in sleep mode most
of the time. Small current spikes occur every 100ms, which is the frequency with which the
network card leaves sleep mode to listen for any waiting packets. There are two clear sets
of higher peaks, which are the times when the client sends the query to the surrogate and
subsequently receives a response from the surrogate. In contrast, if the client downloads
the ﬁles and performs the checksums locally, it cannot exploit the power saving sleep mode
during the duration of download. We anticipate that applications like transcoding proxies
will have similar energy beneﬁts because of how they reduce the amount of data that is sent
to/from the mobile client.
We conclude by noting that the power saving mode that we employ is fairly conservative.
Even greater power savings are possible should the mobile client employ a more aggressive
power saving mode, e.g., bounded slowdown mode [47].
9.4.3 Summary
In this section we have discussed the design of a surrogate service using the collective infras-
tructure. We have shown that surrogates enable powerful mobile applications and reduce
the energy consumption of mobile clients. In particular, we demonstrated experimentally
that the use of a surrogate improved the response time of speech recognition by a factor of
120 while reducing the energy drain on the client device by a factor of 60. Using a surrogate
to perform a synthetic web services operation improves response time by a factor of 21 and
reduces mobile client energy drain by a factor of 48.
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Conclusion
In this dissertation, we have presented a system that exploits the idle compute, storage, and
networking resources of myriad network-connected computers distributed around the world.
Unlike previous eﬀorts to harness idle resources of end-nodes across the Internet, our
incentive and interaction model is neither based on altruism, nor on the bartering. Instead,
we use a currency based incentive model. Our system is based on a collective manager (CM)
that manages the resources of large pools of untrusted, selﬁsh, and unreliable participating
nodes (PN). Participating nodes provide idle resources to the CM, which unify these resources
to run meaningful distributed services for external clients, and pays back participating nodes
in proportion to their contributions. Our approach provides a useful alternative to the typical
P2P approach; it provides a more eﬀective utilization of idle resources, has a more meaningful
economic model, and is better suited to building commercial distributed services.
We have designed and implemented two services on top of a collective model - a collective
content distribution service (CCDS) and a collective backup service (CBS). Especially, we
have designed a collection of security and economic mechanisms as part of these services that
ensure accountability across diﬀerent transactions. This accountability is then tied up with
an incentive model and an oﬄine accounting system to correctly compensate participating
nodes and to create deterrents against cheating.
Our incentive model provides explicit credits to participating nodes for each work per-
formed for successful delivery of services. Additionally to provide an incentive for nodes to
provide stable resource levels and to penalize cheating, the amount of credits received by a
node in return for work depends on the node’s long term consistency. Thus in a collective,
consistently correct behavior leads to better incentives over the long term, and similarly
cheating behavior have long term negative implications. We show that while we cannot
prevent users from being dishonest, our mechanisms mitigate cheating behavior by making
it economically unattractive. We show that a small probability of catching cheaters (under
4%) is suﬃcient for creating a successful deterrence against cheating. We further show that
our incentive system can be used successfully to motivate nodes to remain in the system for
prolonged durations.
We use an information aware scheduling system that exploits the underlying diversity in
end-nodes’ resources to mitigate the aﬀect of unreliability and heterogeneity inherent in the
system.
91Overall we show that a collective system is an excellent approach for eﬃciently exploiting
idle resources to build commercial services. We envision that collectives centered around
competing CMs can grow to millions of nodes and act as an excellent infrastructure for
exploiting idle resources and for building new and interesting services.
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